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I. INTRODUCTIONW HILE the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas Legislature
have been unwilling to create or significantly expand claims re-
lating to disputes as to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, employees or former employees do not hesitate to sue employers
for a variety of workplace torts. Avoiding the limited damages available
in a breach of contact claim, e.g., no punitive damages, employees often
allege more lucrative claims such as sexual harassment, race or sex dis-
crimination, defamation, invasion of privacy, retaliatory discharge and
the like. The courts in Texas continue to wrestle with an employee's tort
claims and the employer's defenses to these claims. Occasionally an em-
ployee will urge the courts to abandon the employment at will doctrine
and adopt a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment rela-
tionship, but the supreme court has flatly rejected that suggestion. In a
time when good jobs are often hard to find, employees remain inclined to
sue their former employers for compensation arising out of the loss of
their job. While there have not been landmark decisions in the area of
employment torts during the past year, the courts are continually strug-
gling with the tort claims of employees and the employers' defenses
which seek to limit those claims.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an in-
definite term may be terminated at will and without cause, absent an
agreement to the contrary.1 Although the Texas Legislature has enacted
statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, 2 the doctrine has
1. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990) (citing East Line &
R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)); City of Alamo v. Montes, 904
S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ requested); Hussong v. Schwan's
Sales Enters., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ);
Cot6 v. Rivera, 894 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ); Loftis v. Town of
Highland Park, 893 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ); Sebesta v. Kent
Elecs. Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Mott
v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied);
Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, writ denied); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993) affd as modified, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d
131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
2. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon 1995) (discharge for exercising rights
under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007
(Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.§§ 431.005, 431.006 (Vernon 1990) (discharge for military service); id. § 554.002 (Vernon
1994) (discharge of public employee for reporting violation of law to appropriate enforce-
ment authority); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (dis-
charge for refusing to participate in an abortion); repealed by 1989 Act; id. art. 5547-300,
§ 9 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to mental retardation); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 101.052 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge for membership or nonmembership in a union);
[Vol. 49
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
remained intact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last
105 years.3 In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only non-statu-
id. § 52.041 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge for refusing to make purchase from employer's
store); id. § 52.051 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge for complying with a subpoena); id.
§ 21.051 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national
origin, age, or sex); id. § 21.055 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge for opposing, reporting or
testifying about violations of the Commission on Human Rights Act); id. § 451.001
(Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge based on good faith workers' compensation claim); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (discharge due to withholding order for
child support); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (discharge of
nursing home employee for reporting abuse or neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge
an employee at will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.§§ 151-169 (1994) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity or filing
charges or giving testimony); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-16 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (discharge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, national
origin and religion); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C. § 626, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a,
1988, 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111, 12112 and 12209 (1988 & Supp.
1993) (discharged based on discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (discharge based on discrimination); Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1994) (discharge on basis of disability in programs receiving
federal funds); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870, and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-
1992, 1994-1996 (West 1996) (discharge for discriminatory reasons); Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) (discharge of employees for exercising
rights under the Act); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.§§ 1140-1141 (1994) (discharge of employees to prevent them from attaining vested pen-
sion rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1994) (discharge for
exercising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12108 (Supp. 1993) (discharge
on basis of disability).
3. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577,
577 (Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d
733, 735 (Tex. 1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102(1888); City of Alamo, 904 S.W.2d at 733 (public employee does not have a property right
to public employment unless the employer abrogates its power under state law to discharge
employees without cause); Amador, 855 S.W.2d at 133 (refusing to create additional public
policy exceptions to the at-will rule); Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ("The employment-at-will doctrine is the law of
our state."); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. App.-Waco
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Bernard v. Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 WL 575520, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.], Oct. 20, 1994, writ denied) ("Texas continues to remain committed to the judi-
cially-created employment at-will doctrine."); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 252 (Texas adheres
to the employment-at-will doctrine); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65,
68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Corp., Inc., 830
S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied); see also Camp v.
Ruffin, 30 F.3d 37, 38-39 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995) (Texas employ-
ees are terminable at-will); Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993);
Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (employment-at-will doctrine
well settled in Texas); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991)
(at-will doctrine accepted in Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992) (recognizing only one exception to at-will doctrine
in Texas); Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 984 (1991) (Texas courts continue to follow the historical at-will rule); Spiller v.
Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has
decided that a public policy halo surrounds the at-will doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co.,
862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts do not hesitate to apply employment-at-will
doctrine); Geise v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-91-2703, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 5, 1993); (Texas has long followed the employment-at-will doctrine); Rayburn v. Eq-
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tory exception to the at-will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
Hauck.4 The Sabine Pilot court held that public policy, as expressed in
uitable Life Assurance Soc'y. of the U.S., 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas
courts have long recognized the employment at will doctrine); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus,
Inc., No. H-90-3641, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992) (Texas follows the employment at
will doctrine); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex.
June 17, 1991) (recognizing the long-standing employment at-will rule in Texas); Perez v.
Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing long-standing employ-
ment at-will doctrine in Texas); Taylor v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297,
301 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts have continuously recognized employment-at-will rule);
Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will doc-
trine remains firmly entrenched in Texas common law). See generally Garcia v. Reaves
County, Tex., 32 F.3d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (pursuant to TEX. LOCAL Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 85.003(c) (Vernon 1988) (deputies' employment is terminable at-will and county
commissioners have no authority to change that status).
4. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affd on remand,
807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991), created a short-lived second exception and held that public
policy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was the
employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the employee's
pension fund. Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that ERISA
preempted the McClendon common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen-
don, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court declined to expand the
public policy exception in Sabine Pilot or to adopt a private whistle blower exception to the
employment at-will doctrine. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 723; see Thompson v. El Centro Del
Barrio, 905 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (issue of private
whistleblower cause of action should be left to the supreme court); Burgess v. El Paso
Cancer Treatment Ctr., 881 S.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Tex. App.-El Paso, writ denied) (follow-
ing Winters); Ford v. Landmark Graphics Corp., 875 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994, no writ) (follows Winters). The Texas Whistle Blower Act protects state
employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith violation of law
to an appropriate law enforcement authority. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a,
§ 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991). For a complete discussion of Winters, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W.
Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331,
334-36 (1991) [hereinafter Pfeiffer & Hall, 1991 Annual Survey]. The Texas Supreme
Court may eventually recognize a second exception to the employment at-will doctrine to
protect private employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith a
violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority. See Winters, 795 S.W.2d at
725. Such a cause of action will probably generate a significant amount of litigation. See
Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ
denied) (jury awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee who was discharged for reporting
wrongdoings within his agency); Janacek v. Triton Energy Corp., No. 90-07220-M (Dist. Ct,
Dallas County, Tex., May 22, 1991) (jury awarded $124,000,000 to a former employee who
was discharged for refusing to sign an annual report allegedly containing misleading infor-
mation); see also Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 902 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Jones v. City of Stephenville, 896 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1995, no writ); City of Houston v. Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (employee recovered damages after being dis-
charged from employment for reporting violations of law to the appropriate authorities);
and Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied)
(city employee discharged for reporting a violation of law recovered damages under Texas
Whistle Blower Act). But see Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 952
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995) (employee failed to present sufficient
evidence to support a finding that his employer was aware that Robertson's actions ex-
ceeded the scope of his duties as contract administrator); City of Beaumont v. Bouillion,
896 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. 1995); Blocker v. Terrell Hills City, 900 S.W.2d 812, 812-13 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (police officer's termination was for altercation
with another police officer and not for reporting that the city manager kept separate over-
time records in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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the laws of Texas and the United States, which carry criminal penalties,
required an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an em-
ployee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act
ordered by his employer. 5 Since that decision, many discharged employ-
ees have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claim of wrongful discharge
within this exception. 6
5. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160,1171 n.16
(5th Cir. 1988) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the
violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' (quoting Sab-
ine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735)); Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (employer cannot confront an employee
with the choice of performing an illegal act or risk termination for insubordination). But
see Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989,
writ denied). In Del Mar, the court held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee
has a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act
which may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she
be allowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can
determine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the
act).
Id. at 771.
6. E.g., Pease, 980 F.2d at 1000 (amended complaint that fails to allege that plaintiff
was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal penalties does not state claim under Sab-
ine Pilot); Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379 (allegation that plaintiff was instructed to violate un-
specified customs regulations does not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Aitkens v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 935 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. June 14, 1991) (not published) (dentist's contention
that he was fired for refusing to violate ethical or professional standards or to engage in
tortious activities insufficient under Sabine Pilot); Willy, 855 F.2d at 1171 n.16 (Sabine Pilot
exception is limited to cases where the violations of law which the employee refused to
commit carry criminal penalties); Ray v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. H-93-3258 (S.D.
Tex. May 16, 1994) (court refused to extend Sabine Pilot to employees who report OSHA
violations); Guerra-Wallace v. SER-Jobs for Progress Nat'l, Inc., No. 3-92-CV-1319-X
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1993) (plaintiff's claim not within Sabine Pilot because her only allega-
tion is that she was discharged for "snitching" to the Department of Labor); Hoinski v.
General Elec. Corp., No. 3-91-CV-1034 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1992) (plaintiff could meet Sab-
ine Pilot test because one reason for his termination was his admitted role in an improper
pricing scheme); Gallagher v. Mansfield Scientific, Inc., No. H-90-2999, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 17, 1991) (plaintiff's refusal to sell inter-aortic balloons he believed to be defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous and presenting risk of death or serious bodily injury not
within Sabine Pilot exception); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Management Corp., No. CA3-
88-2556-T, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for reporting
illegal fraudulent expense reports of former high-ranking management employees not
within Sabine Pilot exception); McCain v. Target Stores, No. H-89-0140, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 3, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for investigating falsification of time cards by
another employee not within Sabine Pilot exception); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25 (Texas
Supreme Court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to cover employees who reported illegal
activities); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994,
writ denied) (employment-at-will does not violate public policy, statutes, or common law
of the state); Ford v. Landmark Graphics Corp., 875 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994, no writ) (Sabine Pilot does not apply to employee who reports employer's al-
leged illegal activities); Cooper v. Raiford, No. 09-93-161-CV, 1994 WL 529945, at *4-5
(Tex. App.-Beaumont, Sept. 19, 1994, no writ) (terminating employee because of cancer
not within Sabine Pilot); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 253 (employer's requirement that em-
ployee take a polygraph test not within Sabine Pilot exception); Medina v. Lanabi, Inc., 855
S.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (employees failed
to bring claim within Sabine Pilot exception); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993)
(discharged employee who claimed discharge was due to her possession of information
which could implicate the company in criminal misconduct did not state claim under Sab-
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A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or
is left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at will and with-
out cause. 7 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge
litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agree-
ment has increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed
modify the employment at-will doctrine and require the employer to
demonstrate good cause for the discharge of an employee.8
In Camp v. Ruffin,9 Robert Camp sued his employer, Harper Trucks,
and its president, Phillip Ruffin, complaining that his employer breached
his employment contract by failing to provide him the salary raises and
commissions he was promised upon accepting employment. Ruffin ar-
gued that Camp could not establish a breach of contract claim because
Camp's employment was terminable at will.10 The federal district court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed." Because there was no written contract, Camp's employ-
ment was terminable at will and could not serve as the basis of a claim for
breach of contract. 12
1. Written Modifications of the Employment at Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically pro-
ine Pilot); Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ denied) (claim of discharge due to objections to exploratory shaft for a nuclear
waste storage project for Department of Energy not within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v. Ex-
press One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (court
declined to extend Sabine Pilot to include employees discharged for performing illegal acts
which carry civil penalties); Burt v. City of Burkburnett, 800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (claim of police officer that discharge resulted from
his refusal not to arrest a prominent citizen for public intoxication and thus refusing to
perform an illegal act not within Sabine Pilot).
7. E.g., Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440,445 (N.D. Tex. 1994), affd 51
F.3d 54 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995); Federal Express Corp. v.
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron
Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70,
75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); City of Alamo v. Montes, 904 S.W.2d 727, 733 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1995, writ requested); Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); see also Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall,
Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9(1988) (citing several cases discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
8. Papaila, 840 F. Supp. at 445; East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992,
writ granted), affd 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994); cf. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (court
held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit illegal act,
noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will employees).
9. 30 F.3d 37 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 39.
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hibited the employer from terminating the employee's service at will.13
The written contract must provide in a "meaningful and special way"'14
that the employer does not have the right to terminate the employment
relationship at will.15 The necessity of a written contract arises from the
statute of frauds requirement that an agreement which is not to be per-
formed within one year from the date of the making must be in writing to
be enforceable. 16
Where no actual employment contract exists, it has been argued that an
employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or salary (stated
per week, month or year) can provide a basis upon which the employee
may argue that there is a written employment contract. The cases, how-
ever, are difficult to reconcile and are decided on the specific facts
involved. 17
13. Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v.
H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 984 (1991) (ap-
plying Texas law); Comprehensive Care Corp. v. Bosch, 899 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ); Loftis v. Town of Highland Park, 893 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1995, no writ); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ de-
nied); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ);
Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988,
no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Lee Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577 (quoting Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at
406). See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
15. Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992); City of
Alamo, 904 S.W.2d at 733; Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; Rodriguez v. Benson Properties,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275,277 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at 253; McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand,
807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (citing Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846;
Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 127. In Webber, the court held that to establish a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, the discharged employee must prove that there was a written employ-
ment agreement that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to ter-
minate the contract at will. Id. at 126. In Benoit the court added that the writing must "in
a meaningful and special way" limit the employer's right to terminate the employment at
will. 728 S.W.2d at 406. But cf. Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court suggested that the phrase "in a special and
meaningful way" is not a necessary part of analysis).
16. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez, 716 F.
Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Wi-
nograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982));
Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
denied); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406.
17. Hussong, 896 S.W.2d at 325; Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577. See Winograd, 789
S.W.2d at 310 (letter confirming employment and annual salary held to be a contract of
employment); Dobson v. Metro Label Corp., 786 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, no writ) (memorandum reflecting annual salary held insufficient to constitute a con-
tract); W. Pat Crow Forgings, Inc. v. Casarez, 749 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1988, writ denied) (letter agreement promoting employee to supervisor and assuring em-
ployee that he could return to previous position if he was not a satisfactory supervisor
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A similar, but usually unsuccessful, argument for avoiding the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is that an employee handbook or employment ap-
plication constitutes a contractual modification of the at-will
relationship.1 8 Texas courts have generally rejected such arguments, in-
stead adhering to the general rule that employee handbooks do not con-
stitute written employment agreements, provided the handbooks (1) give
the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the handbook,
(2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook does not constitute
an employment contract, or (3) do not include an express agreement
mandating specific procedures for discharging employees.' 9 Therefore,
protected employee from at-will termination); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Menden-
hall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employer's subse-
quent confirmation letter regarding employment and employee's annual salary held not to
be a written contract); see also Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand for annual salary indicates plaintiff assumed
his employment agreement was for 1-year term); Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d
55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter stating the salary and length
of employment equated to a contract for term of employment); Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus
Co., 354 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (letter presentedjury question as to terms of employment); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter contemplating at least one year of
employment together with plaintiffs detrimental reliance on contents of letter presentedjury question); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1930, no writ) (without specified period of service, the determination is fact sensitive).
In Sornson v. Ingram Petroleum Servs., Inc., 851 F.2d 1420 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (unpub-
lished opinion), the plaintiff was offered employment in a letter stating that he would be
paid "at a rate of $58,000 per year." After 9 months of employment, the plaintiff was
discharged. He subsequently sued for breach of contract. The sole issue in the case was
whether, under Texas law, an offer of employment promising compensation and an annual
rate creates, upon acceptance, an employment contract for a 1-year term, or whether such
language merely establishes a rate of pay under a contract of unlimited duration. The
court held that, despite promising an annual salary, the contract was of unlimited duration
and therefore terminable at-will.
18. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989) (not published);
Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North Texas Mun. Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220,
1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D.
Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156-57 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Cotd v.
Rivera, 894 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ); Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d at 69;
Salazar, 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; see also Brian K. Lowry, Comment
The Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive Law:
The Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying principles
of consideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
19. Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1992); Crum v. American Airlines,
Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1991); Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 471-72; Pruitt v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1991); Falconer, No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9;
Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T Info.
Sys., 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. SA-88-CA-
1256, 1991 WL 329563, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No.
3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp.
199, 200-01 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez, 683 F. Supp. at 622;
Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Dutschmann, 846
S.W.2d at 283; Washington v. Naylor Indus. Servs., Inc., 893 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 155; Mott v. Montgomery County,
882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied); Johnson v. Randall's Food
Mkts., Inc., 869 S.W.2d 390, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995); Almazan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d
776, 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Corp,
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employee claims of a contractual modification of the at-will relationship
based on a handbook have generally been unsuccessful. 20
Employment contracts may also modify the at-will rule. Texas follows
the general rule, which provides that hiring at a stated sum per week,
month, or year is definite employment for the period named and may not
be ended at will.2' Once the employee meets his burden of establishing
that the contract of employment is for a term, the employer must estab-
lish good cause for the discharge.22 To claim wrongful discharge, the em-
ployee has the burden to prove that: 1) he and his employer had a
contract that specifically provided that the employer did not have the
right to terminate the employment at-will; and 2) that the employment
contract was in writing if the contract exceeded one year in duration.23
Further, the writing must limit the employer's right to terminate the em-
ployment at-will "in a meaningful and special way."'24 For example, em-
ployment based upon an annual salary limits "in a meaningful and special
way" an employer's prerogative to terminate an employee during the pe-
riod stated.25
In Massey v. Houston Baptist University,26 John Massey filed suit after
resigning from Houston Baptist University (HBU) to avoid termination.
Massey began his employment with HBU as administrative staff in 1969.
Prior to starting work for HBU, HBU's president sent a letter to Massey
outlining the terms of his employment, including his monthly salary. The
Inc. 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hatridge, 831
S.W.2d at 69; Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Musquiz v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co., No.
04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, July 12, 1989, no writ) (unpublished opinion);
Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar, 754 S.W,2d at 413; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728
S.W.2d at 407; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d
60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739,
744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d
757, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v.
Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). But see Texas
Health Enters., Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ)
(oral representation and portion of employee handbook supported breach of contract find-
ing). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a contract modifies at-will rule where employee handbook included detailed
procedures for discipline and discharge and expressly recognized an obligation to discharge
only for good cause).
20. Federal Express Corp., 846 S.W.2d at 284; Washington, 893 S.W.2d at 312; Rivera,
894 S.W.2d at 540; Loftis, 893 S.W.2d at 155; Almazan, 840 S.W.2d at 780-81; Hatridge, 831
S.W.2d at 69; McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 818.
21. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; (citing Lackey, 203 S.W.2d at 561).
22. Id. at 578 (citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
23. Id. at 577 (citing Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 126); see
Papaila, 840 F. Supp. at 445.
24. Lee-Wright, Inc., 840 S.W.2d at 577 (quoting Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406).
25. Id. (citing Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310) (employer's agreement to hire employee
for 5 years at a salary of $2000 per month limits the employer's prerogative to terminate
the employee's employment during that time except for good cause).
26. 902 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
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letter did not contain any specifics regarding the term of employment. In
his lawsuit, Massey contended that the 1969 letter represented a written
employment contract between himself and HBU abrogating the employ-
ment at will doctrine. The Houston Court of Appeals disagreed,27 ex-
plaining that a written contract alone is not sufficient to rebut the
employment at will presumption.28 The Court stated that "an employ-
ment contract must directly limit in a 'meaningful and special way' the
employer's right to terminate the employee without cause."'29 The court
reasoned that because the language of the 1969 letter listed Massey's sal-
ary as $916.67 per month, at most, Massey had a one month contract. 30
Therefore, HBU was prohibited from arbitrarily terminating Massey dur-
ing that one month. Because the letter did not reference lifetime employ-
ment, however, the letter was insufficient to alter the at-will status of
Massey's employment. 31
In Cotg v. Rivera,32 a former clerk in the accounting section of the
Travis County Juvenile Court Department sued Travis County and county
employees for wrongful termination. The clerk contended that Travis
County's employee handbook constituted a contract for employment and
created a property interest in her position. The handbook established
personnel policies that provided Travis County employees with proce-
dural rights to protect due process, such as hearing and grievance pro-
ceedings. The Austin Court of Appeals, however, did not agree that
these policies created a property interest for the clerk in her employment
with Travis County.33 The court reasoned that merely establishing certain
procedures for termination is not the kind of express agreement that can
modify an at-will employment relationship. 34 Therefore, the employee
handbook did not constitute an employment contract. 35
In Figueroa v. West,36 Anabelle Figueroa sued her former employer af-
ter she was terminated for insubordination. Figueroa asserted that the
employee handbook modified her at-will employment status, precluding
her termination. The trial court entered a directed verdict against Figue-
roa, which she appealed. The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment. 37 Recognizing that Texas courts generally reject the theory that
a personnel manual alters the at-will relationship, 38 the court observed
that an employment manual will have this effect only if the manual specif-
ically and expressly curtails the employer's right to terminate the em-
27. Id. at 83-84.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 83-84.
31. Massey, 902 S.W.2d at 84.
32. 894 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
33. Id. at 541.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 902 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
37. Id. at 704-05.
38. Id. at 704.
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ployee. 39 The manual must restrict the at-will relationship in a
meaningful and special way.40 Applying this law, the court noted that the
employee manual at issue did not satisfy these criteria.41 On the con-
trary, the manual merely reduced to writing the employer's employment
policies for the benefit and convenience of the employees.4 2 The manual
did not change the at-will relationship, thus, Figueroa's wrongful termina-
tion claim failed as a matter of law.43
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment at Will Doctrine
Generally, an employment relationship is created when an employee
and an employer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment.
Oral employment contracts may defeat an employer's right to terminate
an employee at will, depending upon the terms of the agreement and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into
an oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only for good
cause." An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance
of employment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) cre-
ates an enforceable contract of employment. Normally, the employer will
counter by alleging that the agreement violates the statute of frauds,
which provides that an oral agreement not to be performed within one
year from the date of its making is unenforceable. 45 The duration of the
oral agreement determines whether the statute of frauds renders the
agreement invalid.46 When no period of performance is stated in an oral
employment contract, the general rule in Texas is that the statute of
frauds does not apply because the contract may be performed within a
year.47 If an oral agreement may cease upon some contingency, other
39. Id. at 705.
40. Id.
41. 902 S.W.2d at 705.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Mansell v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940);
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 836 S.W.2d at 667-68; Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners,
Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck
Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,
690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co.
v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 279
U.S. 852 (1929).
45. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan, 764
S.W.2d at 827; see also Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 805 F. Supp.
1401, 1406 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
46. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463 (citing Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827).
47. Id. at 468 n.4; Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Texas law); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);
Bratcher, 162 Tex. at 321-22, 346 S.W.2d at 796-97; Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473,
477, 154 S.W.2d 637,639 (1941); Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc.,
709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorel-
sky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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than by some fortuitous event or the death of one of the parties, 48 the
agreement may be performed within one year, and the statute of frauds
does not apply.49 Generally, the statute of frauds nullifies only contracts
that must last longer than one year.50
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of
the employer's assurance.5 1 For example, an oral agreement that employ-
ment will continue until normal retirement age is unenforceable because
the agreement must last longer than one year, unless the employee is
within one year of normal retirement age at the time of the oral agree-
ment.52 The courts are split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to
an oral promise of lifetime employment. Some cases hold that the prom-
ise of lifetime employment must be in writing,5 3 while other cases con-
clude that such a promise does not need to be in writing, because the
employee could die within one year of the oral promise.5 4 The courts are
also split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral promise of
continued employment for as long as the promisee performs his work
satisfactorily.55 Some cases hold that such a promise must be in writing,5
6
48. Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
writ)(If, by terms of oral employment agreement, its period is to extend beyond a year
from date of its making, "'the mere possibility of termination ... within a year because of
death or other fortuitous event does not render [the statute of frauds] inapplicable."'
(quoting Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948))).
49. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. Sch. Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581,
584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
50. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan,
764 S.W.2d at 827.
51. Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920).
52. Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Papaila,
840 F. Supp. at 445; Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 489; Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728
S.W.2d at 407; Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hurt, 444 S.W.2d at 344; Green v. Texas Eastern
Prods. Pipeline Co., No. H-89-1005, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991).
53. Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 984 (1991); Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886
F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989) (not designated for publication); Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406;
Brown v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, No. 01-94-00554-CV, 1995 WL 19225, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 19, 1995, no writ); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829
S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf
Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v.
M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
54. Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110-11, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. 1948);
Central Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ dism'd);
see also Gilliam v. Kouchoucos, 340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (Tex. 1960) (oral contract of employ-
ment for 10 years is not excluded from the statute of frauds by a provision that it would
terminate upon the death of the employee).
55. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of authority);
Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406 (noting conflict between Pruitt and Falconer).
56. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-66 (holding that it was bound to follow Falconer even
though the court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer, 886 F.2d
1312 (oral agreement of employment for as long as the employee "obeyed the company
rules and did his job" barred by the statute of frauds); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (interpreting Texas law) (oral agreement of
employment so long as employee performed satisfactorily violates statute of frauds); Wal-
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while other cases conclude that a writing is not required because the ter-
mination of employment could occur within a year of the oral promise. 57
The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth Circuit. Hope-
fully, the Texas Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the
confusion in the near future.
In Massey v. Houston Baptist University58 the court addressed Massey's
contention of an oral agreement between himself and Houston Baptist
University. Massey contended the HBU president's oral offer of lifetime
employment modified his at-will employment status. In support of his
position, Massey offered the affidavit of one of HBU's former presidents,
who stated he promised Massey employment "for life" or "until retire-
ment" as long as Massey's work was satisfactory. HBU asserted that the
alleged oral contract violated the statute of frauds. The Houston (First)
Court of Appeals agreed with HBU. 59 The court noted that a promise of
permanent or lifetime employment must be reduced to writing to be en-
forceable. 60 Because the promise of lifetime employment was merely
oral, Massey could not recover for breach of contract. 61
In Conway v. Saudi Arabian Oil Company62, the plaintiffs filed suit
against a prospective employer contending that the employer breached its
employment contract to assign one of the plaintiffs to a certain job site in
Saudi Arabia. The plaintiffs and the employer executed a written em-
ployment contract, which stated that the plaintiffs would be stationed in
Saudi Arabia. The plaintiffs alleged that the agents of the prospective
employer implied and stated orally that the plaintiffs would be assigned
to Ras-Tanura, Saudi Arabia. Just weeks before leaving for Saudi Ara-
bia, however, the employer notified the plaintiffs that their station had
been changed to Udhailayah, Saudi Arabia. The plaintiffs sued for
wrongful discharge. The federal district court held that the plaintiffs did
not assert a viable claim for wrongful discharge and granted the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment.63 The court noted that Texas law
disfavors oral agreements that alter the rights of parties to a written em-
ployment contract. 64 The court also reasoned that the evidence of an oral
agreement to assign the plaintiffs to Ras-Tanura was inadmissible, since
Mart Stores, Inc., 829 S.W.2d at 342-43 (holding oral promise of job for "as long as I
wanted it and made a good hand" barred by statute of limitations).
57. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 836 S.W.2d at 669-70; McRae v. Lindale Indep.
Sch. Dist., 450 S.W.2d 118,124 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardison v. A. H.
Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ); see also John-
son v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 91-93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(plaintiff stated cause of action for breach of express employment contract by alleging that
his at-will status was modified by oral agreements with supervisory personnel that he
would not be terminated except for good cause and that his employment would continue so
long as his work was satisfactory).
58. 902 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
59. Id. at 84.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 867 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Tex. 1994).




the written employment contract was unambiguous.65
3. Estoppel
In Leach v. Conoco, Inc.,66 Colin and Marianthe Leach sued Conoco,
Inc., asserting a claim of promissory estoppel. Conoco employed Leach
from September 1984 through January 1993. In March 1991, Conoco
offered Leach a position with Conoco Norway, Inc. and Leach accepted
that offer. The plaintiffs alleged that Conoco orally promised that the
assignment would continue for at least four years. Mr. Leach commenced
his assignment in Norway in April of 1991. In early June 1991, Mrs.
Leach resigned from her employment and joined her husband in Norway.
Less than one month later, however, Conoco reassigned Mr. Leach to
Houston. Mr. Leach continued to work for Conoco until January of 1993,
when he requested a voluntary severance package and retired early.
The Leaches subsequently filed suit against Conoco, claiming that they
relied to their detriment on Conoco's oral representation that Mr.
Leach's Norway assignment would last four years. The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Leaches' estoppel claim.
The court explained that promises which cannot be performed within one
year from the date of making fall within the statue of frauds. 67 The court
noted that the two written letters of offer and acceptance regarding Mr.
Leach's assignment in Norway did not indicate the duration of his assign-
ment.68 These letters did not satisfy the statute of frauds because they
did not contain the essential elements of the agreement between Conoco
and the Leaches.69 The agreement could not be ascertained without
resorting to oral testimony.70 The court also noted that Conoco neither
promised to reduce its oral agreement with Mr. Leach to writing nor rep-
resented to him that the agreement satisfied the statute of frauds.71 To
estop the assertion of an otherwise valid statute of frauds defense against
an oral promise, (1) the promise must be to sign a written agreement that
satisfies the statute or (2) there must be substantial reliance upon an oral
representation that the statute has been satisfied. 72 Because Conoco's
alleged promise did not satisfy either one of these criteria, the court of
appeals found that the Leaches failed to raise a fact issue as to their claim
of promissory estoppel.73
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
65. Id.
66. 892 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd).
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tional distress, 74 the Texas Supreme Court75 and courts of appeals, 76 the
74. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically rejected the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 603 (Tex. 1993); Daigle v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 893 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd by agr.); Farring-
ton, 856 S.W.2d at 24. The following cases hold that no cause of action for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress arises out of termination of employment: Brunnemann v. Terra
Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992); Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d
358, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864 (1992); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
805 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Geise v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-91-
2703 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993); White v. H.S. Fox Corp., No. 3:92-CV-0628-H (N.D. Tex. Jan.
14, 1993); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Austin v.
Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2,
1992); Soto v. City of Laredo, 764 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Taylor v. Houston
Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Sauls v. Union Oil Co.
of Calif., 750 F. Supp. 783, 790 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-
2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL
102799, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Cent., 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105
(E.D. Tex. 1988). Additionally, if an employee's emotional distress claim arises during the
course and scope of his employment, and the employer is a subscriber under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the employee's claim for emotional distress is barred by the Act and
his remedy is for workers' compensation benefits under the Act. Schauer v. Memorial
Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437,452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); McAlister v.
Medina Elec. Corp., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
75. Randall's Food Mkts. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Wornick Co. v.
Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 743 (Tex. 1993) (observing that in Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d
619, 621 (Tex. 1993) the supreme court adopted the elements of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965)); Diamond Shamrock Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex.
1992).
76. Brown v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, No. 01-94-00554-CV, 1995 WL 19225, at
*7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 19, 1995, no writ); DeMoranville v. Specialty Re-
tailers, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 90, 94-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ requested);
Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501, 506 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1995, no writ); Nayef
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 895 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ);
Rivera, 894 S.W.2d at 542; Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV,
1994 WL 575520 at *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Oct. 20, 1994, writ denied);
Cooper v. Raiford, No. 09-93-161CV, 1994 WL 529945, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Beaumont,
Sept. 19, 1994, no writ); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653, 660-61
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, writ denied); Shaheen v. Motion Indus., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 88,
92 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409, 412
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); Reeves v. Western Co. of North Am., 867
S.W.2d 385, 391 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied); Farrington, 865 S.W.2d at
247; Qualicare, Inc. v. Runnels, 863 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, no writ);
Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
no writ); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied);
Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 848 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd on
other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993); Benavides v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 77 and the federal district courts78 have
consistently required plaintiffs to establish a level of conduct that is "ex-
treme and outrageous" as that term is defined in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.79 Whether conduct "is extreme and outrageous" is a
77. Hadley v. Vain P.T.S., 44 F.3d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1995); Grizzle v. Travelers Health
Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 269 n.28 (5th Cir. 1994); Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117,
122-23 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 881 (1994); Oldham v. Western, 15 F.3d 1078
(5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994) (unpublished opinion); Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co., 14 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1993); McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 741
(5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153-
54 (5th Cir. 1993); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir.
1993); Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992); Ra-
mirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1992); Guthrie v. Tifco
Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992); Wilson v. Mon-
arch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1991); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885
F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., No. 92-4338,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19908, at *15 n.14 (5th Cir. 1993).
78. Gearhart v. Eye Care Ctrs. of Am., 888 F. Supp. 814, 823 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Scott v.
City of Dallas, 876 F. Supp. 852, 860 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Blackwell v. J.C. Penney Co., No. H-
93-2669 9 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 1995); Smith v. Block Drug Co., No. H-92-2431 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 4, 1994); Guerra-Wallace v. SER-Jobs for Progress Nat'l, Inc., No. 3:92-CV-1319-X
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1993); Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., No. 3:91-CV-1327-X
(N.D. Tex Nov. 9, 1993); Severson v. Derbyshire, No. H-93-92-2490 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9,
1993); Powell v. Vista Chem. Co., No. H-93-1781 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1993); Estelle v. Nei-
man-Marcus Group, Inc., No. 3:92-CV-2035-H (N.D. Tex. July 30, 1993); Robinson v.
Ameriscribe Management Servs., Inc., No. 3:93-CV-1167-G (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1993); Jef-
ferson v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. H-91-008, slip op. at 18-19 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29,
1993); Hoinski v. General Elec. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1034-G (N.D. Dec. 4, 1992); Anderson
v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1489-G (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1992); Garcia v.
Pepsi-Bottling Group, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 464, 464 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1992),
affd, 4 F. 3d 990 (5th Cir. 1993); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 885
(S.D. Tex. 1992); Garcia v. Webb County Dist. Attorney, 764 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D. Tex.
1991); Young v. Dow Chem. Co., 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. J 40,793 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991);
Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990);
Koehler v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., No. H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Perez v. Airco
Carbon Group, Inc., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 582 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9,1990); Castillo
v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power
Corp., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1678 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8,1990); Benavides v. Wood-
forest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1989); In re Continental Airlines
Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 860-61 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839,
slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp.
994, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 1990); Ismail v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1990); Austin v.
Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1990 WL 339487, at *1, *3 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Starrett
v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Yarbrough v. La Petite
Academy, No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Cent., 710
F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp.
938, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D. Tex.
1987).
79. Liability for outrageous conduct exists only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possi-
ble bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolera-
ble in a civilized community. Generally, the case in [which outrageous
conduct is found] is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor,
and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
[Ljiability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoy-
ances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society
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question of law for the court.80 As predicted by Justice Hecht in Wornick
Co. v. Casas,8l the Supreme Court's failure to articulate any principles for
concluding what behavior constitutes "extreme and outrageous" conduct
has resulted in inconsistent results by the courts of appeals, particularly in
summary judgment cases.82 The validity of Justice Hecht's conclusion can
be assessed by reviewing the appellate court decisions, both published
and unpublished.
In MacArthur v. University of Texas Health Center at Tyler,83 Cassandra
MacArthur, a research laboratory technician, sued the University of
Texas Health Center at Tyler (Health Center) and several of its employ-
ees for intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial, a jury
awarded MacArthur $65,000 in damages for the alleged emotional dis-
tress. The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the award of damages. 84 The
court held that in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the employment context, MacArthur must show more than
mere employment disputes.85 Rather, the alleged violative conduct must
be extreme and outrageous, and outside the realm of an ordinary employ-
ment dispute.86 After examining MacArthur's evidence, the court con-
cluded that some of the Health Center's employees may have been rude
to MacArthur on occasion, but none of their behavior was so uncivilized,
so based on malice, or so destructive as to rise to the level of outrageous
behavior.87
Another case, Kelly v. Stone,88 addressed the issue of employer liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Charlotte Kelly sued her
employer and two fellow employees-the general manager and the office
services division manager-for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and assault. Kelly sued after the office services division manager told her
that they were "soul mates," touched Kelly in an inappropriate manner,
are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsid-
erate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case
where someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an
unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irasci-
ble tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Id.
80. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. In his concurring opinion, Justice Hecht wrote:
With the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court em-
barks on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual
circumstances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and incli-
nation, and guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the
helmsmen, who change with every watch.
Id. at 737 (Hecht, J., concurring).
83. 45 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 892.
85. Id. at 898.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 899.
88. 898 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied).
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discussed with her his marital problems, repeatedly called Kelly on the
phone intercom, and placed an audiotape containing lewd songs on
Kelly's desk. Kelly reported this behavior to her employer, Levi Strauss
& Co. (Levi Strauss), who then arranged a meeting between the em-
ployee, the division manager and the general manager to discuss the divi-
sion manager's behavior. As a result of that meeting, Levi Strauss
ordered the division manager to leave Kelly alone. When the offending
behavior continued, Kelly resigned and sued Levi Strauss, the divisions
manager and the general manager. A jury awarded Kelly $300,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court, however, entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordered that the plaintiff take
nothing.
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed, 89 reasoning that an employer
is responsible for the actions of its employees if they acted within the
course and scope of their employment and in the furtherance of the em-
ployer's business.90 The court opined that it is not ordinarily within the
scope of an employee's authority to commit an assault on a third per-
son.91 In this case, the office services division manager was responsible
for the work of all office employees, including Kelly.92 The court, how-
ever, explained that the division manager's actions were not related to
job requirements and were not done in furtherance of Levi Strauss' busi-
ness. 93 Rather, the division manager was motivated by his own personal
obsession and acted for his own personal gratification.94 The court found
insufficient evidence to support Kelly's argument that the agency rela-
tionship between the division manager and Levi Strauss helped the man-
ager to commit the tortious actions.95 Therefore, the court affirmed the
trial court's judgment. 96
The Houston Court of Appeals addressed the requirement of outra-
geous behavior in Beiser v. Tomball Hospital Authority.9 7 John Beiser, a
former lab technician, filed suit against Tomball Regional Hospital
(TRH) after he was terminated, allegedly for reporting violations of regu-
lations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration. Beiser
sought recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial
court granted summary judgment and the Houston Court of Appeals af-
firmed. The court held that mere violations of the Texas Whistleblower
Act, which precludes termination for reporting violations of law, do not
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 98 Giving employees a mem-
orandum containing negative information regarding their job perform-
89. Id. at 926.
90. Id. at 927.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 928
93. 898 S.W.2d at 928.
94. Id. at 929.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 902 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
98. Id. at 725.
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ance does not amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress.99
The court of appeals also declared that TRH did not behave in an outra-
geous manner by offering to meet with Beiser to commence his grievance
procedure the day after the limitations period ran on Beiser's
whistleblower claim.100 The court explained that this conduct is not ex-
treme and outrageous, absent evidence of an intentional plan by TRH to
mislead Beiser about the grievance procedure. 1 1
In ESIS, Inc. v. Johnson,02 Billy Johnson, a jailer for the Tarrant
County Sheriff's Department, injured himself while cleaning his service
revolver at his residence. Following his injury, the jailer sought worker's
compensation benefits from Tarrant County's self-insured policy man-
aged by ESIS, Inc. Servicing Contractor (ESIS). The benefit review of-
ficer found that the injury occurred within the course and scope of
Johnson's employment. At a contested hearing, however, the hearing of-
ficer found the opposite. The Worker's Compensation Commission Ap-
peals Panel ("Appeals Panel") subsequently reversed the findings of the
contested case hearing, holding that Johnson's injury was incurred in the
course and scope of his employment as a matter of law.
ESIS then appealed the Appeal Panel's decision to a district court. At
trial, the jury found that Johnson's injury occurred in the course and
scope of his employment. ESIS again appealed. The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals affirmed the jury's findings, concluding that the course and
scope of employment is not limited to the exact moment when the em-
ployee reports for work.10 3 If an injury results from activity originating
from employment, the injury is sustained within the course and scope of
employment. 0 4 The court determined that the Appeals Panel "opinion"
was admissible as evidence in the jury trial.10 5 The Sheriff's Department
requires jailers to maintain their weapons in good working order.10 6 Fur-
thermore, jailers are required to possess their own weapon and must take
responsibility for cleaning and maintaining it.' °7 The Sheriff's Depart-
ment does not provide an area at the jail for officers to clean their weap-
ons.' 08 Based on this evidence, the court held that Johnson was acting
within the course and scope of his employment when he cleaned his
weapon at home.' °9
On the other hand, statements made by a supervisor after an em-




102. 908 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ requested).
103. Id. at 557.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 560.
106. Id. at 558.





in Free v. American Home Assurance Co.110 Daniel Free sued his former
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress after he was
asked to resign following a squabble with his immediate supervisor. Free
based his claim on certain conversations that occurred after his resigna-
tion. For instance, Free's supervisor told a headhunter that Free was a
"lightweight" who "lacked a comprehensive grasp of what was necessary
to handle large accounts" and who would "vacillate, procrastinate and
allow things to languish entirely too long.""'1 Free's supervisor also told
another employee that Free was fired "because he had lied about where
he was, had falsified his itinerary, and persisted in lying about where he
was when confronted about his work schedule. 11 2 The court affirmed
the granting of summary judgment by the trial court, holding that the
statements by Free's supervisor could not be considered so utterly intol-
erable or atrocious as to be extreme or outrageous and sustain a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1 3
Similarly, in Bhalli v. Methodist Hospital14 Sherry Bhalli, a dietitian,
sued her employer, Methodist Hospital, for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Bhalli became concerned with the quality of patient care
at the hospital and voiced her concern to the hospital's officers. After
these meetings, Bhalli claimed her department head treated her belliger-
ently and restricted her role at work in retaliation for her complaints.
She was transferred out of her department in 1986 and was terminated in
1990. After her termination, she filed suit, claiming that her supervisor
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. The trial court
granted summary judgment against Bhalli and the court of appeals af- -
firmed, holding that the applicable limitations period for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is two years." 5 The court rejected Bhalli's
claim of continuing tort because there was no tortious act that occurred
within the limitations period since Bhalli's own affidavits showed that the
last act supporting her cause of action occurred in 1986.'16 Once the tor-
tious acts have ceased, the cause of action accrues and suit must be
brought within two years."17 Therefore, Bhalli's claim failed.
In Hooper v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,118 Elaine Hooper brought suit against
her former employer, Pitney Bowes, and her supervisors in their individ-
ual capacity for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hooper con-
tended the supervisor's descriptions of her, including "cultist," "occult,"
"unChristian," "sorceress," "Satanistic," and "witch", were extreme and
outrageous. Hooper's supervisors made the statements while investigat-
ing Hooper's questionable motivational techniques. Pitney Bowes did
110. 902 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
111. Id. at 53.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 56.
114. 896 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
115. Id. at 211.
116. Id. at 212.
117. Id.
118. 895 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied).
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not dispute that its employees made the statements, but argued such ac-
tions were not extreme or outrageous and were not made in the scope of
the speaker's employment. The jury awarded Hooper damages for in-
flicted emotional distress. The court of appeals affirmed the jury finding
that the conduct at issue was extreme and outrageous because the high
degree of opprobrium attached to the terms used to describe Hooper
could be considered beyond all bounds of decency, atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized society. 119 As such, this evidence supported a
determination of extreme and outrageous conduct.120 However, the
court overturned the jury's finding that such actions were not in the
course of employment because the statements at issue were made in an
effort to investigate Hooper's conduct, a power within the scope of their
employment. 121
In Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co.,122 Barry Lee and Jose Villa sued Levi
Strauss & Company (Levi Strauss), who contracted with their employer,
contending that a Levi Strauss' sales manager had intentionally inflicted
emotional distress on them by compelling their employer not to assign
them the Levi Strauss account. Levi Strauss had reported its dissatisfac-
tion with Lee and Villa's job performance by directing to their supervisor
a letter outlining its concerns. The trial court granted Levi Strauss' mo-
tion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. 123 The
court noted that Lee and Villa did not comply with Levi Strauss' require-
ments pertaining to security procedures and service.' 24 Accordingly, the
court held that Levi Strauss could insist that Lee and Villa not be in-
volved in servicing its contracts. 125 Further, if the plaintiffs were the only
personnel in the office at issue, Levi Strauss could even demand that Lee
and Villa be fired.' 26 Finally, as Levi Strauss' request was made by pri-
vate letter, and the appellants were terminated in private, the court held
that Levi Strauss' actions did not constitute outrageous conduct as a mat-
ter of law.127
In Fulford v. The Upjohn Co.,128 Herman Fulford sued his former em-
ployer, the Upjohn Company (Upjohn), for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from Upjohn's alleged discriminatory action. In
response to Upjohn's motion for summary judgment, Fulford claimed
that his employer caused him to suffer insomnia, gain weight, increase
tobacco use, and terminate his sex life. In spite of the allegations, the
district court granted the Defendant's motion because Fulford's con-
clusory allegations failed to establish that his employer's actions caused
119. Id. at 776.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 776-77.
122. 897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
123. Id. at 502-03.
124. Id. at 505.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 897 S.W.2d at 506.
128. No. 3:94-CV-0684-P (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 23, 1995).
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his symptoms or that the defendant's conduct was extreme or
outrageous.129
In McCray v. DPC Industries Inc.,130 John McCray filed a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against his employer alleging
that his supervisors failed to diffuse a potentially explosive situation be-
tween himself and co-workers who shouted racial epithets aimed at him.
One particular co-worker threatened McCray's life by pointing a gun at
him in the office parking lot. McCray cited anxiety, difficulty sleeping,
trauma and fright as evidence of the severity of his distress. The district
court, however, granted the employer's motion for summary judgment.13'
First, the court noted that, while it did not condone such behavior, racial
slurs will not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress as a matter of law.' 32 Second, the court held that McCray's em-
ployer could not be liable for the co-worker's actions because assault was
not within the course and scope of Pierce's employment. 133 With little
discussion, the court stated that a failure to intervene could not support a
claim for emotional distress under the facts of this case.' 34 Finally, the
court determined that McCray cited no more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, and anger,135 and that this distress did not rise
to the level of severity required to support his claim.' 36
Disclosure of a positive drug test did not constitute outrageous conduct
in Washington v. Naylor Industrial Services, Inc.137 Samuel Washington
sued his former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress
alleging that the results of his drug test were improperly revealed. Wash-
ington was subject to random drug testing while an employee at Naylor.
Naylor's drug testing policy stated that an employee passed if no drugs
were detected by the Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry test. Pre-
liminary drug tests administered by the lab, called EMIT tests, were not
to be reported to Naylor if positive. Lab results were to be in writing,
marked personal and confidential, and sent to Naylor's vice-president of
administration. One day after Washington's drug test, the lab orally in-
formed Naylor's vice-president that Washington's EMIT test was positive
for cannabinoids. The vice-president told two of Washington's supervi-
sors that Washington failed the screening test, that the confirmatory test
was under way, and that they should not assign Washington hazardous
work assignments. One of those supervisors then told two other supervi-
sors that Washington failed his drug test. Washington subsequently
passed the confirmatory test. The supervisor who told others that Wash-
129. Id.
130. No. 2:94-CV-45 (E.D. Tex. filed Feb. 2, 1995).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 14 (citing.Ugalde v. W. A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.
1993)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16.
135. No. 2:94-CV-45 at 16.
136. Id.
137. 893 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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ington failed the drug test then apologized to Washington for doing so.
Washington was later fired for unrelated reasons. The court upheld the
trial court's granting of summary judgment, holding that Naylor's acts
were not outrageous. 138 Intentional infliction of emotional distress re-
quires "that, (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly[;] (2) that
the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous[;] and (3) that the
defendant caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. ' 139 Outrageous
conduct is that which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.1 40
Whether Naylor's conduct was outrageous is a question of law.1 41 The
court noted that Naylor's communications were prompted by the belief
that Washington tested positive and by the innocent motive of informing
supervisors so that Washington could be scheduled away from hazardous
jobs.142 Therefore, as a matter of law, Naylor's conduct was not
outrageous.' 43
5. Drug Testing
In Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,' 4 the Quaker Oats Company
(Quaker Oats) withdrew a job offer given to Jane Doe after Doe tested
positive for the presence of opiates in a pre-employment drug screening
test. Doe brought suit against Quaker and SmithKline Beecham Corpo-
ration (SmithKline), the drug testing laboratory. Doe alleged that
Quaker and SmithKline were negligent in their failure to 1) warn her to
refrain from poppy seed consumption before the test; 2) inquire about
consumption of poppy seeds on the pretesting questionnaire; 3) properly
review her test results; 4) conduct additional tests to determine whether
the tests indicated poppy seed consumption rather than illegal drug use;
and 5) retain and return her urine sample properly. Doe also alleged that
Quaker Oats breached the employment contract and was negligent by
failing to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to pass the drug test.
Doe additionally alleged that SmithKline tortiously interfered with her
contract with Quaker Oats.' 45 The trial court granted summary judgment
for Quaker Oats and SmithKline, and Doe appealed. With respect to
Doe's negligence claims, the court of appeals reversed the summary judg-
ment as to SmithKline.146 In reversing the trial court's summary judg-
ment as to Doe's claim that SmithKline tortiously interfered with her
contract with Quaker Oats, the court held that a prospective contract for
138. Id. at 313.
139. Id. at 312.
140. Id. at 312-13.
141. Id. at 313.
142. 893 S.W.2d at 313.
143. Id.
144. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993) aff'd as modified, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.
1995).
145. Doe also sought damages against SmithKline and Quaker Oats for defamation.
146. Id. at 256.
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employment-at-will can give rise to a tortious interference claim. 147
With respect to Doe's breach of contract claim against Quaker Oats,
the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. 148 The court ex-
plained that because Doe was employed at-will, Quaker Oats would have
been able to terminate her after starting her job without breaching the
contract if Doe had failed a drug test for any reason. 149 The court saw no
reason to place greater contractual duties on Quaker Oats in a preem-
ployment situation.' 50 The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment as to Doe's negligence claim against Quaker Oats.' 51
The court rejected Doe's claim that Quaker Oats owed "a tort duty in
addition to its obligations under the contract.' 152 In determining the na-
ture of Doe's claim, the court looked to the nature of the loss or damage
and the independence of the alleged tortious conduct from the con-
tract.' 53 Because Doe's alleged loss was her expected earnings as a
Quaker Oats employee, Doe's claim sounded in contract only. 154
SmithKline appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, who determined
that, as a matter of law, Doe could not establish her claims for negligence
against SmithKline.' 55 Although Doe sought to impose SmithKline with
the duty to warn her or Quaker of the effect of poppy seed ingestion
upon a drug test result, the court noted that no other jurisdiction has
imposed such a duty.' 56 The court also refused to adopt section 551 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognizes a general duty to
disclose facts in a commercial setting.' 57 The court reasoned that section
551 would not establish a duty in this negligence cause of action since no
fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and confidence existed be-
tween SmithKline and Doe.' 58 The court concluded that the duty Doe
sought to impose upon SmithKline was not readily definable.' 59 Rather,
a generalized duty would require SmithKline to inform each test subject
of the possible effect of poppy seeds and all possible causes of false posi-
tive drug test results.' 60 Imposing this duty would burden SmithKline
with a responsibility it never sought.' 6' Therefore, the supreme court af-
firmed the court of appeals' holding that a factual dispute barred dismis-
sal of Doe's tortious interference claim.' 62 The court found there was
147. Id. at 258.
148. Id. at 254.
149. 855 S.W.2d at 254.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 257-58.
152. Id. at 257.
153. Id.
154. SmithKline, 855 S.W.2d at 57.
155. SmithKline, 903 S.W.2d at 354.
156. Id. at 352.
157. Id. at 352-53.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 353.
160. 903 S.W.2d at 353.
161. Id. at 354.
162. Id. at 348.
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some evidence that SmithKline's conduct, if it was wrongful, caused at
least part of Doe's damages.163
Although premature disclosure of a positive drug test may not amount
to intentional infliction of emotional distress, can this disclosure consti-
tute slander? In Washington v. Naylor Industries Services, Inc. ,164 Samuel
Washington sued his former employer, Naylor Industrial Services, Inc.
(Naylor), contending that Naylor's premature disclosure of a positive
drug screen constituted slander. The lab and Washington's supervisor re-
ported the positive screen prior to a second independent and detailed
chemical analysis which rendered a negative result. The trial court
granted Naylor's motion for summary judgment on Washington's slander
claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. 165 Although the premature re-
porting of Washington's positive drug screen breached Naylor's internal
policies, the report was not false. 166 Therefore the literal truth of the
statements regarding Washington's positive drug screen was a complete
defense. 167 Although Naylor had an interest in informing Washington's
supervisor about the preliminary drug screen, which would support a
qualified privilege to a claim of slander, the truth of the statements made
it unnecessary to assert this privilege. 168
6. Defamation
Under Texas law defamation is "a defamatory statement orally commu-
nicated or published to a third person without legal excuse.' 69 A court
must make the threshold determination of whether the complained of
statement or publication 70 is capable of conveying a defamatory mean-
ing.171 In making this determination, the court construes the statement as
163. Id. at 355.
164. 893 S.W.2d at 309.
165. Id. at 311.
166. Id
167. Id. (citing Randall's Food Market, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex.
1995)).
168. Id. at 311.
169. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law) (quoting Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
no writ)). Texas law defines libel as a statement:
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, in-
tegrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and
thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
TEX. CIV. PRAC, & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
170. See Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.). In Marshall Field, the court held that the
circumstantial evidence did not support the jury's verdict of defamation because it could
lead to two conclusions: one, that the employer published the information to the employ-
ees, or two, that the employees learned the information from gossip resulting from the
events surrounding the termination. Id. at 400.
171. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989) (citing Musser v. Smith Protective
Serv. Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987)); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A.,
766 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
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a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering how a per-
son of ordinary intelligence would understand the statement.172 Only
when the court determines the language is ambiguous or of doubtful im-
port should a jury determine the statement's meaning and the effect of
the statement on an ordinary reader. 173 The courts have also held that a
former employer's refusal to discuss with a prospective employer the rea-
sons or circumstances surrounding an employee's termination does not
constitute defamation. 174 Of course, communication that is truthful is an
absolute defense to a defamation claim.175
The Waco Court of Appeals addressed defamation in the employment
contract in Eskew v. Plantation Foods, Inc..176 Gregory, Gary, and Guy
Eskew sued Plantation Foods for defamation. The Eskews worked in the
172. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub-
lishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See McKethan v. Texas Farm
Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994) (the evidence
showed that there had been teasing and laughter at the convention, but the court also
considered the context of a jovial recognition ceremony, the nature of the remarks, and the
employee's prominence as an exceptional district sales manager; therefore, the court con-
cluded that a person of ordinary intelligence would not attribute a defamatory meaning to
the "cutting comments"); Crum, 946 F.2d at 429 (announcement to the staff that employee
on leave pending results of an investigation by an industrial psychologist/management con-
sultant, whose job was to examine the organization at the airline's magazine, cannot be
construed as an allegation of mental disturbance).
173. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; (citing Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655). See Denton Publish-
ing Co. v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d
612, 618-19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1009 (1985) (illustrating how a statement that may not appear defamatory may be con-
strued as defamatory by a jury). In Buck, one of Buck's prospective new employers tele-
phoned Hall & Co. to learn about the circumstances surrounding Buck's termination. One
of Hall & Co.'s employees stated that Buck had not reached his production goals. When
pressed for more information, the employee declined to comment. The prospective em-
ployer then asked if the company would rehire Buck, and the employee answered no. The
prospective employer testified that because of the comments made by the company's em-
ployee's, he was unwilling to extend an offer of employment. Buck sued his former em-
ployer for defamation of character alleging that Hall & Co. employees made defamatory
statements about him during the course of telephone conversations with Buck's prospec-
tive employers. The jury found in favor of Buck. The company appealed the jury determi-
nation that the alleged statements were defamatory, contending that the words were
susceptible to a nondefamatory interpretation because Buck was never explicitly accused
of any wrongdoing or called anything disparaging. The court disagreed and concluded that
sufficient evidence existed to show that the prospective employer understood the state-
ments made by the defendant's employee to be defamatory. Id. at 619. Because the state-
ments were ambiguous, the court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's
statements were calculated to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious
misconduct. Id.
174. Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 WL 575520, at
*1, *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 1994, writ denied) (former supervisors held not to
have a duty to talk to prospective employer); American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano,
821 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (former employer has
no duty to talk to anyone about a former employee). See Geise v. The Neiman Marcus
Group, Inc., No. H-92-2703, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993) (an employer's "gag
order" imposed on employees to prevent discussion of reasons for another employee's
termination is not defamatory).
175. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995); Naylor, 893
S.W.2d at 311 (communication of results of a drug test to employee's supervisors was a
truthful communication, and therefore, it was not actionable).
176. 905 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, no writ).
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maintenance department of Plantation Foods. Plantation Foods investi-
gated irregularities in the maintenance department and terminated a
number of employees, including the Eskews. The president of Plantation
Foods was quoted in the newspaper as saying that although he did not
believe that everyone terminated from the maintenance department was
involved with the irregularities, some were. The Eskews claimed that
anyone knowing them would believe that Plantation Foods' comments
referred to them. The court disagreed, holding that a member of a group
has no cause of action for a defamatory statement directed to some or
less than all of the group, when nothing singles out the plaintiff.177 The
court concluded that Plantation Foods' comments did not realign the en-
tire group but only an unidentifiable portion. 178 The court emphasized
that the defamation must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable per-
son, who must be the plaintiff.179 Therefore, the plaintiff could not re-
cover for defamation.'8 0
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation oc-
curs when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory state-
ment about a former employee.' 8 ' The doctrine of self-publication
provides that publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to
publish defamatory statements in response to inquiries of prospective em-
ployers, and the former employer should have foreseen this compul-
sion.182 Unlike other jurisdictions, 183 Texas does not consider whether
177. Id. at 462.
178. Id. at 463.
179. Id. at 464.
180. Id. at 463.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977) (defining publication as inten-
tional or negligent communication of defamatory matter to person other than the
defamed).
182. See Howard J. Siegel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Con-
text, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 7-8 (1994) (reviewing the rules and reasoning of various jurisdic-
tions that permit defamation actions supported by self-publication); Diane H. Mazur,
Note, Self-Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6 REV. LrrIG. 313, 314
(1987). TWo cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of self-publication. See Chasewood
Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(holding it was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from project for theft would
be required to reveal reason for dismissal to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d
696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding it was reasonable
to expect that a former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required to
disclose this information in employment interview or application). See also Purcell v.
Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chasewood and
Ake, the court observed that Texas courts recognize the narrow exception of self-com-
pelled defamation); Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (court recognized Ake but declined to ad-
dress self-publication because the case was reversed on other grounds); Reeves v. Western
Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied) (observ-
ing that the self-defamation doctrine has not been recognized by all Texas courts).
183. See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little,
315 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d
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the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defamatory words;
instead Texas courts focuses on the foreseeability that the words will be
communicated to a third party. 184
In Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.,185 Jeffrey Duffy sued his for-
mer employer, Leading Edge Products, Inc. (Leading Edge) for defama-
tion complaining that Leading Edge compelled self-publication of
defamatory statements against Duffy during Leading Edge's investigation
of reported sexual advances made upon two of Duffy's co-workers.
Leading Edge argued that it had a qualified privilege to make the alleg-
edly defamatory statements regarding Duffy-a privilege that would ex-
tend to any self-republication. After Leading Edge presented its
undisputed argument of qualified privilege, the district court held that
Duffy failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence of malice to defeat
the privilege. 186 In affirming, the Fifth Circuit opined that Duffy
presented no evidence suggesting that Leading Edge entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of the communications. 187 As the statements were
not defamatory, the court withheld decision on whether compelled self-
publication defamation is a viable cause of action in Texas.1 88
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in
the course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged. 189 Damages may not be recovered for privileged communica-
tion even though it is false and published with malice.1 90 The privilege
has also been extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards,
876, 895 (Minn. 1986) (Simonett, J., dissenting) (contending that the following must be
proven in order for statement to be self-compelled: (1) a strong compulsion exists to dis-
close the defamatory statement to third parties; (2) the existence of the strong compulsion
was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer; and (3) such disclosure was actually made).
184. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' rec-
ognition of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Comment k provides:
Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defama-
tory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it
to a third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so
communicated. It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a
third person be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an
act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be commu-
nicated to a third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication.
A negligent communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an
intentional communication.
Id. (citations omitted). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977). See
Reeves v. Western Co. of No. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993,
writ denied) (employee's speculation about possible consequences if prospective employ-
ers learned that he failed the alcohol test did not support his defamation claim).
185. 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995).
186. Id. at 313-14.
187. Id. at 314.
188. Id. at 312 n.5.
189. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
190. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 110, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
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and commissions exercising quasi-judicial powers,191 and to governmental
employees exercising discretionary functions. 192 Examples of quasi-judi-
cial bodies include the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the
Railroad Commission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division
of the Police Department of Dallas, 193 and the Texas Employment
Commission.194
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also
be absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communica-
tion. 195 When a plaintiff consents to a publication, the defendant is abso-
lutely privileged even if the publication is defamatory.196 Texas follows
the general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publication which he,
"consented to, authorized, invited or procured, by the plaintiff, he cannot
recover for injuries sustained by reason of the publication.' ' 197 In other
words, the consent privilege applies when a plaintiff gives references for a
prospective employer to contact and the former employer makes defama-
tory statements. 98 While it is unclear if consent creates an absolute privi-
lege or simply makes the defamation not actionable, the result is the
same.199
We again revisit Washington v. Naylor Industrial Services, Inc. on the
issue of whether improper disclosure of a drug test result constitutes defa-
mation.200 Washington was subject to random drug testing while an em-
191. Id. at 912. See Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 198
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (holding that statements made to the
employment commission are absolutely privileged).
192. Brooks v. Scherler, 859 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no
writ).
193. Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
194. Taylor v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 302-03 (S.D. Tex.
1990); Hardwick, 881 S.W.2d at 198; Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
195. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436-37 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied).
196. Id. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
197. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 94, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)). See
Jones v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law
the court held that plaintiff waived a state law libel claim based on a defendant's publica-
tion of a memorandum to the school district where plaintiff released the defendants from
liability for information they provided to the district); Hooper v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 895
S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (employee consented to defa-
mation when she asked her employer to investigate her motivational techniques).
198. Smith, 827 S.W.2d at 437 (citing 2 F. HARPER ET AL., GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 5.17, at 138-39 (2d ed. 1986)).
199. Id. at 437-38. The court noted that the Restatement and other treatises conclude
that consent creates an absolute privilege. Id. at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 114 at 823 (5th ed. 1984); F. HARPER ET
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.17). The Texas cases seem to suggest that consent simply
makes the defamation not actionable. Id. at 438 (citing Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins.
Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Mayfield v. Gleichert, 437 S.W.2d 638,642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Wilks v.
DeBolt, 211 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ) Lyle, 188 S.W.2d
at 772).
200. 893 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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ployee at Naylor. A supervisor violated Naylor's internal policies by
prematurely revealing positive results of the drug test.201 The court up-
held the trial court's summary judgment, holding that truth was a defense
to Washington's defamation claim.202 The objective truth was that Wash-
ington tested positive on the EMIT test.203 Even if the lab's report to
Naylor breached the confidentiality policy, neither the report nor the su-
pervisors' statements were false.204 A true statement is a complete de-
fense to slander. 205
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under cir-
cumstances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused. 20 6 Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law.
20 7
"A qualified privilege comprehends communication made in good faith
on subject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to
which he has a duty to perform to another person having a corresponding
interest or duty. '208 Generally, an employer's defamatory statements
about an employee, or former employee, to a person having a common
interest in the matter to which the communication relates, such as a pro-
spective employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 209
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or
publication is accompanied by actual malice.210 In defamation cases, ac-
tual malice is separate and distinct from traditional common law mal-
201. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.




206. See Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989, slip op. at 2673 (5th
Cir. 1993) (not released for publication); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir.
1990); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman
v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.--T'ler 1980, no
writ); Houston v. Grocers Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd)); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 936.
207. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800
(citing Oshman's, 594 S.W.2d at 816; Mayfield, 484 S.W.2d at 626.
208. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800); see Holley, 827
S.W.2d at 436; Pioneer Concrete, Inc. v. Allen, 858 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937; 2 F. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 5.26 at 228 (2d ed. 1986); see also Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646; Naylor,
893 S.W.2d at 312.
209. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Butler, 458 S.W.2d at 514-15; Ramos v.
Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (citing Grocers
Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800; Oshman's, 594 S.W.2d at 816); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
210. See Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646; Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d
240, 242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1970);
Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939,
943-444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); see also Danawala, 4 F.3d 989, slip op. 2673
(unauthorized gossip spread by unidentified co-workers does not take the defendants
outside the scope of the qualified privilege).
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ice. 211 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive; rather,
it requires "the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or
with reckless disregard of whether it is true. '212 Reckless disregard is
defined as "a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of
which the plaintiff must present 'sufficient evidence to permit the conclu-
sion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication."' 21 3 An error in judgment is not sufficient to show
actual malice.214
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not
address the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation
actions,215 decisions in other jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of
self-publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment
context.216 One federal district court in Texas recognized that such a
privilege may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court ren-
dered judgment on other grounds.217
With regards to the requirement of actual malice, Texas courts have not
set forth a high standard. In Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing
211. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989). See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d
567, 571 (Tex. 1989).
212. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328
(1974)); Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884
S.W.2d 771, 771-72 (Tex. 1994)); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 554.
213. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731 (1968);
Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 558). The plaintiff's evidence in response to a motion for summary
judgment must amount to more than a conclusion to create a fact issue. See Martin v.
Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 860 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ de-
nied) (holding insufficient evidence exists to create fact issue where plaintiff states that "I
know that most of the assertions made in the letter about me are not true and, therefore:
the letter must have been written based on malice directed at me."); Schauer v. Memorial
Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 450 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding
that plaintiff failed to present clear, positive, and direct evidence of malice to create a fact
issue).
214. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 280 (1971); Chan-
nel 4 KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. 1988)).
215. See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text..
216. See, e.g., Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recogniz-
ing existence of a qualified privilege); Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728
F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that Minnesota law recognizes a qualified
privilege in the employer/employee relationship if statements were made in good faith);
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (recognizing qualified
privilege in the employer-employee context); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986) (concluding that employer's communication to em-
ployee of reason for discharge may present proper occasion upon which to recognize quali-
fied privilege). In Lewis, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the
reason for allowing the qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually pub-
lished the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the
identical communication is made to identical third parties with the only dif-
ference being the mode of publication .... [R]ecognition of a qualified privi-
lege seems to be the only effective means of addressing the concern that
every time an employer states the reason for discharging an employee it will
subject itself to potential liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
217. See Young v. Dow Chem. Co., 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 40,793 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
1991).
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Co. 2 18 Don Hagler sued Proctor & Gamble for libel. Hagler was a forty
year employee of Proctor & Gamble. He was stopped when taking a
telephone he believed he owned from the company plant. After an inves-
tigation, the plant managers voted to terminate Hagler for violating Proc-
tor & Gamble's rule prohibiting theft of company property. The plant
manager posted notice of Hagler's termination for theft on bulletin
boards throughout the plant. The jury found for Hagler, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that there was insufficient factual evidence to
support the jury's finding that Proctor & Gamble acted with actual mal-
ice.219 The Texas Supreme Court denied Hagler's application for writ of
error, holding that actual malice in the defamation context is a term of art
and does not include ill will, spite or evil motive, but rather requires suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 220 The Texas
Supreme Court also disapproved of the court of appeals' conclusion that
actual malice requires a higher level of culpability than mere ill will or
animosity.
In Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc.,221 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of malice. Leading Edge conducted an in-
vestigation of possible sexual advances allegedly made by Duffy against
two of his co-workers. Duffy claimed that this investigation elicited de-
famatory statements against him. The Fifth Circuit held that complaints
of inadequate investigation by themselves do not show malice, even
though investigations conducted as a mere pretext for a predetermined
decision may be some evidence of ulterior motive and might support a
claim of malice in other circumstances. 222
In Free v. American Home Assurance Co.,223 Daniel Free sued his for-
mer employer for slander.224 The court held that the trial court improp-
erly granted summary judgment on Free's defamation claim.225 The court
held that a statement is defamatory "if the words tend to injure a person's
reputation, exposing the person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
financial injury. ' 226 Furthermore, "words which are otherwise not ac-
tionable can become so if they affect a person injuriously in his or her
office, profession, or occupation. '227 The employer claimed that the su-
pervisor's statements about Free to a headhunter were not capable of a
defamatory meaning. But, after noting the headhunter's testimony that
218. 884 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1994).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995). See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
222. Id. at 315.
223. 902 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
224. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
225. 902 S.W.2d at 54.
226. Id. (citing Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
227. Id. (citing Gulf Constr. Co. v. Mott, 442 S.W.2d 778, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1969, no writ)).
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Free would probably not find gainful employment because of the stigma
attached by the supervisor's comments, the court held that a fact issue
existed as to whether the supervisor's statement to the headhunter was
capable of a defamatory meaning.228
In addition, the employer did not establish the affirmative defense of
invitation. 229 Under this defense, a plaintiff may not recover for a publi-
cation to which he has consented, or which he has authorized, procured,
or invited.230 This privilege applies where the plaintiff has given refer-
ences to a prospective employer, and the former employer makes defam-
atory statements about the plaintiff.231 The privilege bars recovery even
if the speaker acted with malice.232 In this case, the court held the privi-
lege inapplicable because Free did not know in advance what the em-
ployer might say.233 The court also found, in the alternative, that the
employer did not establish that the conversations were protected by a
qualified privilege.234 A qualified privilege protects communications
made in good faith on a subject in which the author has an interest or a
duty to another person having a corresponding interest or duty.235 The
privilege is lost if the statement was made with malice and, in a summary
judgment context, the defendant assumes the burden of proving absence
of malice. 236 The employer failed to prove that the supervisor acted with-
out malice; no evidence was offered regarding the supervisor's subjective
state of mind in making the statements at issue.237 Thus, the court held
that the employer failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the supervi-
sor's statements were privileged.
7 Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied
contractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court 238 and the
228. Id.
229. Id. at 54-55.
230. 902 S.W.2d at 54 (citing Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)).
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing Holley, 827 S.W.2d at 438).
233. Id. at 55.
234. Id.
235. 902 S.W.2d at 55.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 56.
238. See SmithKline, 903 S.W.2d at 356; Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846
S.W.2d 282, 284 n.1 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (noting that the Texas Supreme Court has
declined to recognize a general duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employer-em-
ployee relationship); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991),
affd 757 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988) (holding that no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing restricts employer's ability to dissolve employment
contract); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 n.2 (Tex.
1990) (noting several cases that refused to imply duty of good faith and fair dealing into all
at-will employee relationships); see also Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462 (5th
Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that Texas courts do not recognize a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the employment relationship); Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49
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courts of appeals239 have refused to recognize such an obligation. It ap-
pears that the Texas Supreme Court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.240 On remand from the United States Supreme
Court,241 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' deci-
sion242 that there is not an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment relationship.243 The McClendon court of appeals spe-
cifically declined to extend the Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.244 duty of good faith and fair dealing to the employment
relationship. 245 The McClendon court held that the special relationship
between insurers and insureds is not equally applicable to employers and
employees, and that to extend it to the employment relationship would
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Bates v. Humana, Inc., No. SA-92-CA-432, 1993 WL 556416, at
*1, *11 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1993); Raybum v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 805 F. Supp.
1401, 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas courts do not recognize either contractual implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing or tort duty of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment relationships); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (W.D.
Tex. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment relationship); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
1990) (Texas courts do not recognize a claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (no duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment
relationships); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (Texas
courts do not recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships).
239. See, e.g., Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1994, writ denied); Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ
dism'd w.o.j.) (en banc) (rejecting claim for duty of good faith and fair dealing in the em-
ployment relationship); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993,
writ denied) (recognizing that the supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to recog-
nize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment area); Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied)
(no cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993); (rejecting a
claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court recognized that the cur-
rent mood of a majority of the supreme court is to adhere to the at-will rule); Lumpkin v.
H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,
writ denied) (court rejected an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the em-
ployment relationship).
In Lumpkin, the sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals was whether an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee rela-
tionship. Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of
error, and Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumpkin v. H & C Commu-
nications, Inc., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of
error had been pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the
court decided McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S.
133 (1990), aff d on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991). Curiously, the supreme court did
not grant Lumpkin's application when it granted McClendon's application to consolidate
the cases. Nevertheless, shortly after McClendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application
for a writ of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Dec. 6, 1989).
240. 807 S.W.2d at 577.
241. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
242. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988).
243. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
244. 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (the duty of good faith and fair dealing extended
to insurers and insureds).
245. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
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be tantamount to imposing such a duty on all commercial relation-
ships.246 Imposing the duty on the employment relationship would also
violate the supreme court's disapproval of restrictions on free movement
of employees in the workplace.247 Finally, the volumes of legislation re-
stricting an employer's right to discharge an employee compels the con-
clusion that such a dramatic change in policy affecting the employer-
employee relationship and the employment at-will doctrine should be left
to the legislature.248
8. Fraud and Misrepresentation
In Leach v. Conoco, Inc.,249 Colin and Marianthe Leach sued Colin's
former employer for fraud. Colin was a Conoco employee for nine years
when he accepted Conoco's offer to transfer him to Norway. The
Leaches alleged that Conoco orally promised them that this transfer
would last for more than four years. However, within months of being
assigned to Norway, Colin was reassigned back to his former position in
Houston, Texas. The Leaches then filed suit, contending that Conoco de-
frauded them. On summary judgment, Conoco asserted the statute of
frauds defense. The trial court granted Conoco's summary judgment. In
affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that when a plaintiff in
asserting fraud, attempts to rely upon an allegedly fraudulent oral prom-
ise to enforce his principal employment contract, the statute of frauds is a
defense to that fraud claim.250 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
fraud claim was premised upon a breach of an oral promise to maintain a
four-year assignment in Norway and, therefore, was founded solely in
contract. 251 The plaintiffs were asserting fraud to avoid the application of
the statute of frauds to their claim for the breach of an oral promise. The
court also held that Colin, as an at-will employee, was barred from bring-
ing a cause of action for fraud against his employer based on the em-
ployer's decision to discharge. 252
In Camp v. Ruffin,253 Robert Camp sued his employer, Harper Trucks,
and its president, Phillip Ruffin, complaining that Ruffin misrepresented
Camp's projected commissions and salary before he accepted employ-
ment. Camp contended that to establish his claims he only had to show
that he acted in reliance of Ruffin's salary promises and that he was dam-
aged by out-of-pocket losses or by not receiving the benefit of his bar-
246. Id. at 819.
247. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
248. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Watson v. Zep Mfg.
Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
249. 892 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
250. Id. at 960.
251. Id. at 961.
252. Id. at 960-61.
253. 30 F.3d 37 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995).
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gain.254 Ruffin argued that Camp was unable to prove damages because
the loss of expected commissions and a pay raise are insufficient to sup-
port a claim of financial injury as a matter of law.255 The district court
granted Ruffin's motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed. 256 Financial injury is not measured by what the plaintiff might
have gained, but by what he actually lost.257 Thus, the court held that
Camp's inability to establish cognizable damages under Texas law de-
feated his claims for fraud and misrepresentation. 258
In Figueroa v. West,259 Anabelle Figueroa sued her former employer
after she was terminated for insubordination. Figueroa claimed that her
employer committed fraud. Both the trial court and the court of appeals
found that Figueroa did not assert a viable cause of action.260 The El
Paso Court of Appeals explained that the failure to perform a future act
constitutes fraud only when the defendant did not intend to perform the
future act at the time the representation was made. 261 However, the fail-
ure to perform a future act, alone, is not evidence of fraudulent intent.2 62
Turning to the evidence, the court of appeals noted that Figueroa pro-
duced no evidence that her employer intended to violate the provisions of
the employee handbook, which was the basis of Figueroa's fraud claim.263
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order directing a
verdict in favor of Figueroa's employer. 264
9. Tortious Interference
In Massey v. Houston Baptist University,265 John James Massey re-
signed his administrative staff position with Houston Baptist College, the
predecessor of Houston Baptist University (HBU), to avoid termination.
Subsequently, Massey filed suit against HBU's current president for tor-
tious interference with his employment contract. On summary judgment,
the HBU president contended that he acted in his official capacity with
regard to Massey's employment and, therefore, "was privileged as a mat-
ter of law to 'interfere with Massey's employment status.' ' 266 The Hous-
ton Court of Appeals held that the at-will employment agreement can be
a subject of the claim for tortious interference. 267 However, an agent
cannot be personally liable for tortiously interfering with his principal's




258. 30 F.3d at 38.
259. 902 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
260. Id. at 707.
261. Id. (citing T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex.
1992)).
262. Id. (citing Spoijaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W. 2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986)).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 902 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
266. Id. at 84.
267. Id. at 85.
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contract. 268 Therefore, the court found that because the HBU president
was acting within the course and scope of his employment, he could not,
as a matter of law, interfered with Massey's employment.269
In Bhalli v. Methodist Hospital,270 Sherry Bhalli, a dietitian, sued a
department head at Methodist Hospital for tortious interference with
contractual relations. Bhalli became concerned about the quality of pa-
tient care at the hospital and voiced her concern to the hospital's officers.
Bhalli claimed that Dr. Suki, the department head in her area, treated her
belligerently and restricted her role at work in retaliation for her com-
plaints. Dr. Suki was the Chief of Renal Service and Director of the
Community Dialysis Unit at Methodist Hospital. He was also a professor
at Baylor College of Medicine. In 1986, she was transferred out of that
department. In 1990, she was terminated. After her termination, she
filed suit claiming that Dr. Suki tortiously interfered with her employ-
ment relationship with Methodist. The court held that Dr. Suki was
Methodist Hospital's agent and, thus, as a matter of law, could not have
interfered with Bhalli's employment relationship with Methodist.27'
In Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co.,272 Barry Lee and Jose Villa sued Levi
Strauss, contending that Levi's insistence that plaintiffs not be involved in
servicing its contracts constituted tortious interference with their employ-
ment contract. Levi Strauss asserted the affirmative defense of legal justi-
fication, claiming that it had a right to advise plaintiffs' employers not to
allow plaintiffs to service its contracts when Levi Strauss determined that
appellants were not responsive to its needs.273 The trial court granted
Levi Strauss' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals af-
firmed, reasoning that employees of companies with ongoing business re-
lationships are properly subject to discharge upon complaints by
customer companies, and that such complaints should be expected if per-
sonal performance is substandard. 274 While the plaintiffs claimed that
Levi Strauss was reacting negatively to a cutback in entertainment pro-
vided by them, the court determined that this did not create a fact issue
regarding Levi Strauss' bona fide exercise of its rights and could not pre-
clude summary judgment.275
10. Other Creative Claims
In Figueroa v. West,276 Anabelle Figueroa sued her former employer
for fraud and negligent termination after being discharged for insubordi-
nation. The trial court and the El Paso Court of Appeals found that
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 896 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
271. Id. at 210-11.
272. 897 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
273. Id. at 505.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 506.
276. 902 S.W.2d at 701.
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Figueroa did not assert a viable negligence cause of action.277 The court
of appeals held that one of the elements of a negligence cause of action is
the existence of a duty.2 78 In the context of a negligent termination
claim, Figueroa was required to prove the existence of some duty on the
part of her employer not to terminate her.279 However, Figueroa's em-
ployer did not owe her, as an at-will employee, any duty concerning con-
tinued employment.280 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's directed verdict, dismissing Figueroa's claim for negligent
termination.
Figueroa also asserted that the termination violated the Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Both the trial court
and the court of appeals found that Figueroa could not viably assert this
claim.2 81 The court explained that to assert a DTPA cause of action,
Figueroa was required to establish her status as a consumer.2 82 To pos-
sess consumer status, a person must seek or acquire goods or services.2 83
The court of appeals held that Figueroa did not produce any evidence
that she was a consumer, concluding that Figueroa obtained work from
her employer, not goods and services. 284 While refusing to hold that a
terminated employee can never recover under the DTPA, the court of
appeals determined that Figueroa did not have a DTPA claim because
she did not establish her status as a consumer.285
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Commentators have urged employees in suits against their employers,
to pursue claims for violations of their state constitutional rights. These
claims have been unsuccessful.286




281. 902 S.W.2d at 706-07.




286. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Ortiz, 856 S.W.2d 836, 839-41 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ denied). Because Albertson's was a completely private entity, the court "de-
cline[d] to recognize a compensatory cause of action to redress a wholly private entity's
infringement of free-speech rights guaranteed by the state constitution". Id. at 840. The
Austin Court of Appeals also observed that in absence of state action, it had refused to
recognize a constitutional action for violation of section 8 of article I of the Texas Constitu-
tion. Id. at 840 n.7 (citing Weaver v. AIDS Servs. of Austin, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)); see Scott v. City of Dallas, 876 F. Supp. 852, 858 (N.D.
Tex. 1995) (probationary employees of Dallas Police Department possess no property in-
terest in continued employment); Jones v. City of Stephenville, 896 S.W.2d 574, 577(Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, no writ) (holding there is no self-operative creation of constitu-
tional tort liability); Vincent v. West Texas State Univ., 895 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1995, no writ) (holding there is no private cause of action for violation of TEX.
CONST. art. 1, § 3a); Rivera, 894 S.W.2d at 542 (holding a plaintiff could not recover for
alleged free speech violations relating to her termination of employment with Travis
County because the plaintiff was afforded all her due process rights, and there is no implied
private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution when an individual alleges
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In City of Beaumont v. Bouillion,287 a group of Beaumont police of-
ficers claimed that they were constructively discharged from their jobs for
reporting official misconduct to the press. Several months after the press
release, and supposedly during department-wide reforms, the employees'
positions were eliminated in a reorganization. The employees then filed
suit against the City of Beaumont, contending that the City violated both
the Texas Whistleblower Act and the employees' rights under the Texas
Constitution. The jury returned a verdict for the employees, and the
court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded. The supreme court held that there is no implied private right of
action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly sec-
tions of the Texas Constitution.288 The supreme court reasoned that the
framers of the Texas Constitution articulated what they intended to be
the means of remedying a constitutional violation. The framers estab-
lished that laws which violate the Constitution have no legal effect.2 89
The framers did not allow for monetary damages for violations of consti-
tutional provisions, but permitted only equitable remedies.290 Therefore,
the court declared that suits for equitable remedies for violation of consti-
tutional rights are not prohibited, while suits for money damages are
barred.291 The court also noted that it cannot look to the Texas Constitu-
tion to define the element of duty for a common law cause of action. 292
In City of Alamo v. Montes,293 Minerva Montes filed suit against the
City of Alamo (the City), its mayor, and four commissioners after she was
removed from her position as city secretary. Although Montes received a
hearing, the City terminated her employment without providing written
reasons for her discharge. Montes claimed that her termination violated
the free speech clause of the Texas Constitution. The jury awarded her
over $60,000. In concluding that Montes could not recover on her consti-
tutional claim, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that there is no
implied private right of action for damages under the Texas Constitution
when an individual alleged the violation of speech and assembly rights. 294
Moreover, there is no independent cause of action for monetary damages
for violation of constitutional rights.295 The court further held that there
is no cause of action for non-equitable relief for wrongful termination
under the Texas Constitution.296
violations of speech and assembly rights under article I, sections 8 and 27 of the Texas
Constitution).
287. 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995).
288. Id. at 147.
289. Id. at 149.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 896 S.W.2d at 150.
293. 904 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ requested).
294. Id. at 731; Harris County v. Going, 896 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that there is no implied right of action for damages aris-
ing under the free speech provision of the Texas Constitution).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 732.
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C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of sections 451.001-451.003297 of the Texas La-
bor Code (formerly article 8307c) 298 is to "protect persons who are enti-
tled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law and to prevent
them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to collect such ben-
efits." 299 A plaintiff bringing a retaliatory discharge claim 300 has the bur-
den of establishing a causal link between the discharge from employment
and the claim for workers' compensation. 301 A plaintiff need not prove
that he was discharged solely because of his workers' compensation
claim; he need only prove that his claim was a determining or contribut-
ing factor in his discharge.30 2 Thus, even if other reasons for discharge
exist, the plaintiff may still recover damages if retaliation is also a rea-
son.30 3 Causation may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence
and by the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. 3° 4 Once the
link is established, the employer must rebut the alleged discrimination by
showing there was a legitimate reason behind the discharge.30 5
297. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003 (Vernon 1996).
298. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993) (cur-
rent version at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003).
299. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
300. Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 816 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied). An employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a gov-
ernmental unit is not required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort
Claims Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986). Id. at 839.
301. Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
writ denied). In Paragon, the court identified four factors in determining whether suffi-
cient evidence supported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the
discharge: (1) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his com-
pensation claim; (2) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a nega-
tive attitude toward the plaintiff's injured condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to
established company policies with regard to progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the
company discriminated in its treatment of the plaintiff in comparison to other employees
allegedly guilty of similar infractions. Id at 658. These four factors may be useful in ana-
lyzing whether there is circumstantial evidence to support a causal link between the filing
of a workers' compensation claim and a subsequent discharge. See Unida v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 986 F.2d 970, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the employees failed to show that
they were discriminated against (or treated differently) since the plant closure resulted in
the discharge of all employees, regardless of whether they had engaged in protested work-
ers' compensation activities).
302. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, no writ); Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385, 388-89 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1990, writ denied); Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685,687 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
303. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ).
304. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, no writ); Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.
305. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
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Section 451 of the Texas Labor Code provides that successful plaintiffs
are entitled to reasonable damages and reinstatement to their former po-
sition.30 6 The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reason-
able damages" to embrace both actual and exemplary damages.30 7
Actual damages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost past
retirement, lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascertain-
able with reasonable certainty. 308 Employees seeking reinstatement on
the ground that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are
presently able to perform the duties of the job that they had before the
injury. 309
The federal courts continue to follow the holding in Jones v. Roadway
Express, Inc.,310 finding that the retaliatory discharge provision is a civil
action arising under the workers' compensation laws of Texas and, there-
fore, not removable to federal court pursuant to title 28 of the United
States Code, section 1445(c). 311 However, such a claim may nevertheless
be removed if it is pendent to a federal question claim.312
In Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez,313 Juanita Cazarez filed
suit against her employer, claiming that she was discharged in retaliation
for filing a workers' compensation claim. Cazarez sustained a work-re-
lated ankle injury, requiring her to be off from work. She filed a workers'
compensation claim and was paid benefits by the compensation carrier.
Cazarez was released to return to work, but became sick with the flu on
the day that she was to report. She told her employer that she would
report to work on November 1, 1991, or November 4, 1991. She did not
phone in or report to work between November 1 and November 7. On
November 8, she was terminated for violating the company's three-day
no-call/no-show rule. The court of appeals upheld the jury's award of
actual and exemplary damages, holding that there was legally and factu-
ally sufficient evidence to support the judgment.314 The court held that
the plaintiff does not have to prove that the discharge was solely because
306. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
307. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 669.
308. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 668; Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex.
1980).
309. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.).
310. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employ-
ment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1765-66 (1992) (dis-
cussing Fifth Circuit's decision in Roadway Express).
311. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1091-92; see Almaza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,
802 F. Supp. 1474, 1475 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keyser v. Kroger Co., 800 F. Supp. 476, 477
(N.D. Tex. 1992); Addison v. Sedco Forex, 798 F. Supp. 1273, 1274-75 (N.D. Tex. 1992); see
also Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1993).
312. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939-42 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding
that workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pendent to a re-
lated and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
313. 903 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
314. Id. at 79.
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of a workers' compensation claim.315 Only a causal connection between
the discharge and the filing of a workers' compensation claim need be
shown as an element of the prima facie case. 316 Circumstantial evidence,
and reasonable inferences from such evidence, can prove the causal con-
nection, and once the connection is established, it is the employer's bur-
den to rebut the alleged discrimination by establishing a legitimate reason
for the discharge. 317 Like other courts, the Houston Court of Appeals
considered five factors to determine if the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to establish a causal link between termination and filing a work-
ers' compensation claim includes: (1) knowledge of the compensation
claim by the termination decision makers; (2) expression of a negative
attitude toward the employee's injured condition; (3) failure to adhere to
established company policies; (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison
to similarly situated employees; and (5) evidence that the stated reason
for the discharge was false.318 Cazarez's circumstantial evidence was nu-
merous and varied; therefore, the court held that there was legally and
factually sufficient evidence to support the judgment. 319 Cazarez showed
that her employer knew of her claim, that she was questioned as to the
real cause of her injuries, that the employer's application for employment
asks if whether the applicant had ever been on workers' compensation,
that she had been evaluated as an outstanding employee and received
twelve raises in fifteen years, and that her supervisor never contacted her
doctor. 320
In Vojvodich v. Lopez, 321 Deputy Mark Vojvodich sued Bexar County
Sheriff Ralph Lopez, alleging that he was transferred and denied a pro-
motion because he was a Republican and supported Lopez's opponent in
the general election. Vojvodich was the head of the narcotics unit, but
was transferred to the communications/dispatch division shortly after Lo-
pez took office. The federal district court granted Lopez's motion for
summary judgment, holding that since Vojvodich occupied a position as
"policymaker," his First Amendment rights were outweighed by Lopez's
interest in having a loyal employee. 322 The Fifth Circuit vacated the dis-
trict court's judgment and remanded the case. The court opined that
whether an employee holds a policymaking position is relevant to the re-
quired balance of interests, but it is not the ultimate determination.323
The relevant balance is between the interests of the employee, as a citi-
zen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public serv-
ices it performs through its employees-it is public concern versus disrup-
315. Id. at 77.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. 903 S.W.2d at 77-78.
319. Id. at 78.
320. Id.
321. 48 F.3d 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 169 (1995).
322. Id. at 882.
323. Id. at 884.
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tion.324 Generally, in cases involving public employees who occupy
policymaking positions, the government's interests more easily outweigh
the employee's interests as a private citizen.325 In conducting the balanc-
ing test, the VoJvodich court considered the following, although not exclu-
sive, factors: (1) the degree to which the employee's protected activity
involved a matter of public concern and the gravity of that concern; (2)
whether close working relationships are essential to fulfilling the respon-
sibilities of the public office and the extent to which the employee's pro-
tected activities may have affected those relationships; (3) the time, place,
and manner of the employee's activities; and (4) the context in which the
employee's activities were carried out.326 The court found, however, that
Lopez failed to allege that Vojvodich's political activities had any effect
on department operations; therefore, there was no countervailing state
interest to weigh against Vojvodich's First Amendment rights.327
In City of LaPorte v. Barfield,328 William Barfield and Allen Ray
Prince claimed that the City of LaPorte (the City) wrongfully discharged
them in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims. Barfield be-
gan receiving workers' compensation benefits after being injured in 1983.
After several weeks, he returned to work on restricted duty. He aggra-
vated his injury in 1986 and again claimed workers' compensation. In
early 1988, he was terminated. The City claimed that he was permanently
disabled and that he was employed under a contract which provided for
termination under such circumstances. The City also asserted that it was
protected from liability by governmental immunity. The trial court
granted the City's motion for summary judgment based on governmental
immunity, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded. 329 Prince was
also injured in 1983 and claimed compensation benefits, which were de-
nied by the city's carrier. Before he was released to return to work, he
was terminated. The city claimed that he was fired for incapacity and
misconduct toward other employees. The jury awarded actual and puni-
tive damages, totaling more than $1.2 million, including interest. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the city's immunity was waived. 330
The Texas Supreme Court consolidated the two cases on appeal.331
The supreme court held that a city is immune from liability for govern-
mental functions, unless that immunity is waived. 332 The court opined
that the hiring and firing of city employees is a governmental function;
therefore, actions related to hiring and firing are subject to the immunity
defense, unless the legislature waived the defense by clear and unambigu-
324. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)).
325. Id. at 885 (citing Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir.
1992)).
326. 48 F.3d at 885 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-53).
327. Id. at 886.
328. 898 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1995).
329. Id. at 291.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 290.
332. Id. at 291 (citing City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. 1985)).
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ous language. 333 In reaching its decision, the court conducted a lengthy
review of the history of the workers' compensation laws of Texas, the
history of the Anti-Retaliation law,334 and the history of the Political Sub-
divisions Law.335 The supreme court worked through a number of diffi-
cult, confusing, and conflicting statutory provisions within the various
laws, ultimately concluding that the 1981 version of the Political Subdivi-
sions Law waived governmental immunity for retaliatory discharge, but
only for the limited relief of reinstatement and backpay.336
In Gunn Chevrolet, Inc. v. Hinerman,337 Mara Hinerman, a former
Gunn Chevrolet employee, filed suit after she was terminated for leaving
work without permission. The employee left work to obtain treatment
for an injury that she had previously suffered while on the job. Hinerman
filed a compensation claim against Gunn Chevrolet eight months later.
However, Gunn Chevrolet was not a subscriber to the Worker's Compen-
sation Act, and Hinerman did not have reason to believe that Gunn
Chevrolet was a subscriber. Later, Hinerman sued Gunn Chevrolet, as-
serting among other claims, retaliatory discharge in violation of sec-
tion 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code. The trial court granted Gunn
Chevrolet's motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals re-
versed. Disagreeing with the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court
found controlling the fact that Hinerman never made a good faith claim
for worker's compensation.338 The court also found that Gunn Chevrolet
was not a subscribing employer and that Hinerman did not have reason
to believe that Gunn Chevrolet was a subscriber.339 Moreover,
Hinerman never claimed that Gunn Chevrolet caused her injuries. 340
The court specifically refused to decide the issue of whether employees of
non-subscribers are protected by section 451.001.34 1 The court also re-
fused to decide whether notice of an employee's on-the-job injury to a
non-subscribing employer who is at fault is sufficient to invoke statutory
protection against retaliatory discharge. 342
In Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc. 3 4 3 Don Burfield sued his
former employer, Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., contending that he was
fired for reporting a job-related injury to his neck. Burfield's employ-
ment continued for one year and four months after the date of injury and
333. 898 S.W.2d at 291.
334. TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 451.001-.003 (Vernon 1995).
335. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d at 291 (citing TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, repealed
and recodified, current version at, TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 504.001-.003 (Vernon 1996).
336. Id. at 297; see Kuhl v. City of Garland, 910 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1995) (holding
that 1989 version of the Political Subdivisions Law waives governmental immunity for re-
taliatory discharge and authorizes reinstatement and backpay as well as recovery for actual
damages, subject to the restrictions of the Texas Tort Claims Act).
337. 898 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. 1995).
338. Id. at 818.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 819.
342. 898 S.W. 2d at 819.
343. 51 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 1995).
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one year and three months after filing a workers' compensation claim.
Burfield then informed his employer that his injury prevented him from
performing the essential functions of his job. The federal district court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed.344 The court noted that the passage of fifteen to sixteen
months between the workers' compensation claim and the discharge mili-
tated against a finding of a causal link between the discharge and the
filing of the workers' compensation claim.34 5 Further, a Texas employer
is legally permitted to terminate an injured employee who, by the nature
of his injury, can no longer perform the essential functions of his job.34 6
The court went on to explain that section 451.001 of the Texas Labor
Code prohibits discharge or other discrimination against employees be-
cause they have filed a worker's compensation claim, hired a lawyer to
represent them in the claim, initiated in good faith any proceeding under
the Texas Workman's Compensation Act, or have testified, or is about to
testify in such a proceeding.347 However, Burfield asserted a retaliatory
discharge claim and had the burden of demonstrating a causal link be-
tween the discharge and the filing of the claim for worker's compensation
benefits. 348 Burfield did not satisfy this initial burden. Burfield's sole ev-
idence of retaliatory discharge was his supervisor's comments indicating
displeasure with Burfield's compensation claim. However, the court
found that the passage of fifteen to sixteen months before Burfield was
terminated militated against the establishment of retaliation. 349
In Gifford Hill American Inc. v. Whittington,350 Paul Whittington filed
suit against his employer for wrongful discharge, alleging that he was
fired in part because of his efforts to recover worker's compensation ben-
efits. Whittington worked for Gifford Hill American ("GHA") as a
welder from 1972 to 1988, when he was diagnosed with a back injury.
Whittington did not realize that his injury was work-related. After suffer-
ing a second injury in March of 1989, Whittington informed his supervisor
that he was unable to work and that he was contemplating filing a
worker's compensation claim. GHA soon terminated Whittington, pur-
portedly pursuant to a reduction in force. Whittington claimed that he
was terminated for seeking worker's compensation benefits. A jury
awarded Whittington almost $125,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in
exemplary damages. On appeal, GHA argued that its uniform applica-
tion of a non-discriminatory policy-the reduction in force-did not vio-
late the retaliatory discharge provision of the Worker's Compensation
Act. GHA failed to request a jury finding on this defense; therefore, the
344. Id. at 590.
345. Id. at 589-90.
346. Id. at 590.
347. Id. at 589 (citing TEx. LABOR CODE ANN. § 451.001).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 590.
350. 899 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
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defense was waived. 35' Moreover, the appellate court found insufficient
evidence to establish that the reduction of force was a uniform, non-dis-
criminatory discharge policy. 352 Consequently, the court of appeals af-
firmed the jury's finding of illegal retaliatory discharge. 353
2. Commission on Human Rights
In Trico Technologies Corp. v. Rodriguez,354 Carlos Rodriguez sued his
former employer alleging that he was terminated due to his age-in viola-
tion of the Commission on Human Rights Act. Rodriguez was over 40 (a
member of the protected class), qualified for the position he held, and
was terminated during a reduction in force. Trico Technologies claimed
that age played no part in the decision to discharge Rodriguez. However,
Rodriguez proved that Trico targeted older employees during its downsiz-
ing and the trial court entered judgment for Trico. The Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals held that there was some evidence that the adverse
employment decision was based on age; however, the court reversed the
judgment because the trial court improperly allocated the burden of
proof to the defendant-employer. 355 The court noted that among the du-
ties of the Commission on Human Rights Act, is execution of the policies
embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.356 Thus, the court
could look to federal case law in interpreting the Act.357 Focusing upon
federal case law, the court noted that an employer has the burden of pro-
duction after the plaintiff produces evidence establishing a prima facie
case.358 According to the court, the employer is never required to assume
the burden of persuasion.359 After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the employer is only required to articulate a nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the adverse employment decision. 360 The court's charge was in-
correct because it required the employer to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Rodriguez's
discharge.361
In Vincent v. West Texas State University,362 Christina Vincent sued
West Texas State University (WTSU) for sexual harassment in violation
of the Commission on Human Rights Act.363 However, Vincent did not
file her complaint with the Commission within 180 days of the alleged
prohibited misconduct; therefore, the court did not have subject matter
351. Id. at 764.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 907 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
355. Id. at 652-53.
356. Id. at 652.
357. Id. at 653.
358. Id.
359. 907 S.W.2d at 653.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. 895 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
363. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. Ann. art. 5221(k) (Vernon 1987), recodified, TEX. LABOR
CODE ArN. § 21.001 (Vernon 1996).
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jurisdiction over the employment discrimination claim. 364 Moreover,
Vincent did not exhaust her administrative remedies and was precluded
from recovering under the Act as a matter of law.365
In Austin State Hospital v. Kitchen,366 Laura Kitchen, a former em-
ployee of the Austin State Hospital (ASH) and the Texas Department of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation (MHMR), sued her employers for
employment discrimination by failing to accommodate her disability. The
case was tried to a jury, which was charged with determining by a prepon-
derance of the evidence whether ASH and MHMR could have reason-
ably accommodated Kitchen. Based on the jury's answer in the charge,
Kitchen obtained a judgment against ASH and MHMR, and the trial
court awarded reinstatement, back pay, lost benefits, and attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and re-
manded the case for a new trial.367 The court held that the jury question
improperly placed the burden upon the employer to prove that there was
no available reasonable accommodation. 368 The court concluded that the
plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination suit bears the initial burden to
prove that some reasonable accommodation by the employer would en-
able the disabled employee to perform his job.369 Because the jury ques-
tion did not apportion the burden of proof correctly, the court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.370
In Holt v. Lone Star Gas Company,371 Pat Holt sued his former em-
ployer, Lone Star Gas Company (Lone Star), after he was terminated,
alleging that the company had discriminated against him based on a disa-
bility-in violation of the Commission on Human Rights Act.372 Holt
was employed as a construction and maintenance worker for Lone Star.
Lone Star enacted a safety program that required Holt to obtain a com-
mercial driver's license. Because of his visual impairment, Holt feared
that he would not qualify for a license; therefore, he refused to visit an
ophthalmologist. When Holt refused, Lone Star then terminated his em-
ployment. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing Holt's employment discrimination claim.
The court noted that the Act precludes discrimination based on a disabil-
ity and defines a disability as "a physical or mental condition that does
not impair an individual's ability to reasonably perform a job. ' 373 The
court found that Holt had a disability by definition.374 However, the
364. Id. at 473.
365. Id. at 474.
366. 903 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
367. Id. at 86.
368. Id. at 92-93.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 93.
371. No. 2-94-200-CV, 1996 WL 65935 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 15, 1996, n.w.h.)
(not released for publication, subject to revision or withdrawal).
372. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221(k) (Vernon 1987), recodified, TEX. LABOR
CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon Supp. 1995).




court held that a genuine issue of fact remains as to whether Holt was
discharged because of his disability; therefore, the court remanded the
case to the trial court. 375
In Leatherwood v. Houston Post Co. ,376 Carlton Leatherwood filed suit
against his employer, the Houston Post Company, alleging violations of
the Commission on Human Rights Act. Leatherwood, who suffered from
bipolar disorder and psychotic episodes, worked for the Houston Post for
22 years. During his employment with the Post, Leatherwood was peri-
odically hospitalized for his disorders. During one hospitalization, the
Houston Post terminated him. Leatherwood argued that this termination
violated the Act because his disability did not impair his ability to per-
form his job. The federal district court set aside the jury's verdict for
Leatherwood and entered judgment for the Houston Post. The Fifth Cir-
cuit reviewed the evidence presented at trial and determined that no rea-
sonable jury could have found that Leatherwood's disability did not
impair his ability to perform his job during the time periods which pre-
ceded hospitalization.377 Consequently, the court held that Leatherwood
was not entitled to relief under the Commission of Human Rights Act.378
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is
unenforceable because it violates public policy.379 The Texas Constitu-
tion declares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivi-
sion are not permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free
government. '380 In 1889, the Texas Legislature enacted its first antitrust
law, which remained almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983.381 Generally, this legislation
prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that unreasonably re-
strain trade or commerce. 382 Historically, Texas courts have closely scru-
375. Id.
376. 59 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 1995).
377. Id. at 538.
378. Id.
379. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,
793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991) (citing Frankiewicz v.
National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v.
Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 186 (1981)); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660,
662 (Tex. 1990); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ). For a thorough analysis of the enforceability of noncompetition agreements, see
Pfeiffer, supra note 316, at 1789-95.
380. TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 26.
381. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
382. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agree-
ment is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate
the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
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tinized private sector contracts which restrain trade.383 However, the
Covenant Not to Compete Act 384 protects noncompetition agreements if
they meet certain statutory criteria. 385
In Light v. Centel Cellular Co.,386 Debbie Light began working for
Centel Telespectrum, Inc. (Centel) as a salesperson in 1985. In 1987,
Light signed an employment agreement with Centel. The agreement pro-
vided that Light was terminable at the will of either Light or Centel. The
agreement also included a covenant by which Light agreed not to com-
pete with Centel in a certain geographical area for a one-year period fol-
lowing her termination. After she resigned, Light sued Centel, the
successor in interest to Centel, asserting that the noncompetition agree-
ment was unenforceable and void. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of Light. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that
Light take nothing against Centel, holding that the covenant not to com-
pete was enforceable, and Light appealed.
The Texas Supreme Court held that its inquiry in this case was two-
fold: (1) whether there is an enforceable agreement, (2) to which the cov-
enant not to compete is ancillary to or a part of at the time the agreement
is made. 387 The court first observed that while Light was an at-will em-
ployee, an at-will employment does not preclude an employer and em-
ployee from entering into other contracts. 388 The court noted, though,
that the promise must not be illusory.389 The court pointed out that a
promise by either party that depended upon future employment is illu-
sory because it is conditioned upon something which is exclusively within
the promisor's control. 390 The court found three promises that were not
illusory and capable of serving as consideration to support the noncompe-
tition agreement: (1) Centel's promise to provide specialized training to
Light; (2) Light's promise to provide Centel. with a 14-day notice if she
383. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880); see Pfeiffer, supra note 310, at 1785-97.
384. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
385. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of
activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other-
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
386. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
387. Id. at 644.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 645 n.5. The court provided the example that a promise of a raise to an at-
will employee is illusory because it is dependent upon some period of continued employ-
ment. Id. As the court noted, upon making such a promise, the employer could fire the
employee and would be under no legal obligation to perform the promise. Id.
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terminated her employment; (3) and Light's promise to provide Centel
with an inventory of all Centel property upon her termination.391 The
court held that "an otherwise enforceable agreement" existed between
Centel and Light.392
The court then addressed whether the covenant is ancillary to or part
of the otherwise enforceable agreement. 393 In this context, the court
adopted the standard that the covenant is not ancillary to a contract un-
less it is designed to enforce a contractual obligation of one of the par-
ties. 394 Therefore, the court held that a covenant not to compete is an
enforceable agreement between the employer and employee, in absence
of two elements:
(1) the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise en-
forceable agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in re-
straining the employee from competing; and
(2) the covenant must be designed to enforce the employee's con-
sideration or return promise in the otherwise enforceable
agreement. 395
The Texas Supreme Court opined that the covenant between Light and
Centel is not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement between
them. 396 The court found that Centel's promise to train might involve
confidential information and that the covenant is not designed to enforce
any of Light's return promises in the agreement i.e., Light did not prom-
ise to keep the information confidential. 397 Thus, the court held that the
covenant not to compete was not enforceable. 398
On remand, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that no evidence existed
to show that Centel tortiously interfered with her future employment
contracts, thus, the court rendered judgment for Centel. 399 The court
stated that Centel exercised what it believed at the time to be a bona fide
legal right within the context of an agreement it had with Light; there-
fore, there was no evidence to support the element of malice.400 Further,
the court stated that Light's additional allegations, which solely con-
cerned Centel's actions prior to Light's resignation, could not have been
directed toward intentionally or maliciously preventing Light from having
a relationship with another employer.40 1
In Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co.,402 Roberts Paper sought a
391. 883 S.W.2d at 646.
392. Id. at 645; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50.
393. Id. at 646-47.
394. Id. at 647 (citing Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 739-41 & n.3, (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
395. Id.
396. 883 S.W.2d at 647.
397. Id. at 647-48.
398. Id. at 648.
399. 899 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ denied).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 901 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
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temporary injunction against its former employees who formed a compet-
itive business, Miller Paper. The employer sought to enjoin the employ-
ees from violating covenants not to compete, uttering false statements
about Roberts Paper, using purportedly confidential information and
trade secrets owned by Roberts Paper, and filling orders belonging to
Roberts Paper. Miller Paper distributed over 1,600 letters to their previ-
ous clients. The letters characterized the recipients as customers of Miller
Paper. They also solicited business from current customers of Roberts
Paper and even represented that Roberts Paper was no longer in busi-
ness. The trial court granted a restraining order and temporary injunc-
tion, and the employees appealed. The Amarillo Court of Appeals held
that the trial court abused its discretion by enjoining the breach of the
covenant, but that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining
the use of confidential information and the filling of orders belonging to
Roberts Paper.4 03 Roberts Paper argued that the covenant not to com-
pete was actually a diversion of trade agreement. Roberts Paper con-
tended that the covenant did not restrict competition; rather, it prevented
the employees from using the relationships and goodwill of Roberts Pa-
per to solicit Roberts Paper's customers previously solicited by the em-
ployees for the benefit of Roberts Paper. The court declared that
covenants not to compete are restraints of trade and disfavored in law.4 04
Covenants not to compete are permitted, however, under the following
criteria: they must be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement and their limitations as to time, geographic area, and scope of
activity must be reasonable and no greater than that needed to protect
the business interest of the employer.405 The court found that the cove-
nant not to compete was not ancillary to an enforceable agreement be-
cause the former employees were at-will employees who will not support
a covenant not to compete.4 06 Furthermore, the court rejected Roberts
Paper's argument and observed that the covenant restricted competition
and was in fact a covenant not to compete, not a diversion of trade agree-
ment.40 7 As to the injunction regarding the use of confidential informa-
tion, the court held that upon the formation of an employment
relationship, certain duties arise apart from any written agreement, such
as an employee's duty not to use confidential or proprietary information
acquired during the relationship in a manner adverse to the employer.408
Furthermore, the duty survives the termination of employment. 40 9 The
court held that while the duty does not bar the former employee from
using the general knowledge, skill, and experience acquired during em-
ployment, it does prevent the employee from utilizing confidential infor-




407. 901 S.W.2d at 599-600.




mation or trade secrets obtained during the course of employment. 410
Compilations of information which have a substantial element of secrecy
and provide the employer with an advantage over competitors (such as
pricing information, customer lists, client information, customer prefer-
ences, buyer contacts, and market strategies) are protected under the
duty.411 The court concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate to
curtail the violation of this duty.412
IV. CONCLUSION
The field of employment and labor law is constantly changing. The
changes in this field bear the characteristics of a pendulum with employ-
ment rights moving back and forth between employers and employees.
As illustrated by the decisions discussed, particularly the decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court, we are in a period of judicial restraint with respect
to employment law in Texas. The court has not expanded rights relating
to the terms and conditions of employment in a manner which encour-
ages the advancements of wrongful discharge claims and related work-
place tort claims. With a 7-2 Republican majority on the supreme court,
employers may take some comfort in the knowledge that the decisions of
the court will probably be more predictable and changes in the common
law more gradual. Responding to a concurring opinion in which a
supreme court justice expressed concern about overruling a two-year old
decision of the court, former Justice Mauzy bluntly explained (when the
Democrats were in the majority): "the makeup of the court has changed
.... The people, speaking through the elective process, have constituted
a new majority of this court which has not only the power but the duty to
correct the incorrect conclusion arrived at by the then-majority" of the
court.413 So the pendulum swings.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. 901 S.W.2d at 600.
413. Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 249, 362 (Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J.,
concurring). Later, Justice Mauzy complained: "[Sbo often this court has spoken of stare
decisis and the stability of the law, yet in this instance the court ignores both legislative-
made law and the court-made common law as announced in its previous opinion in Barclay
v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. 1986) .... Litigants should be able to confidently rely on
the opinions handed down by this court and rely on the procedural rules mandated by its
opinions." McKinley v. Stripling, 763 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. 1989) (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
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